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In Pakistan, competitive forms of procurement include only two-step sealed bidding. In 
the United States, negotiated procurement falls under competitive forms of procurement.  
Pakistan established the Pakistan Procurement Regulatory Authority (PPRA) in 2002 on 
the recommendations of the World Bank and enacted PPRA rules in 2004 based on the 
1994 UNCITRAL model procurement law. The purpose of PPRA rules in 2004 was 
twofold: First, it implemented uniform procurement regime in all federal and provincial 
procurement agencies. Second, it enhanced transparency and capacity of the procurement 
system. Since the enactment of PPRA rules in 2004, the model UNCITRAL was 
amended in 2011. The amended 2011 UNCITRAL law also allows negotiations, such as 
the competitive form of procurement. 
The authors evaluate the Pakistan procurement system UNCITRAL model law 
and the U.S. acquisition system with an intention to find viable circumstances under 
which negotiated procurement can be initiated in Pakistan. The authors use the analogous 
Yoder’s Three Integrated Pillars of Success (TIPS) and find room for improvements in 
three pillars of Pakistan procurement: personnel, platforms, and protocols. The authors 
recommend that negotiated procurement be implemented in Pakistan, provided that the 
three pillars of procurement system are strengthened, along with the broadening of the 
accountability loop. 
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The major expenditure of the public exchequer is the procurement of goods and 
services for the public sector organizations. The procurement is governed by a set of rules 
and regulations directing the public office bearers to achieve optimum value for money 
through the execution of efficient and effective methods in undertaking procurement 
practices.  
Every state has devised a general framework that governs procurement planning 
and execution. The public sector organizations, following these guidelines, devise their 
own methods to achieve best value of money spent on the procurement of goods and 
services for the organization.  
Pakistan established a unified code of rules known as the Public Procurement 
Regulatory Authority of 2004 that provides the guidelines the public procurement. The 
Department of Defense (DOD) in Pakistan also draws its guidelines from the Public 
Procurement Regulatory Authority (PPRA) Rules 2004 to carry out public procurement 
to support its military operations and routine functions. However, due to the peculiar and 
sensitive nature of the activities it undertakes, the Pakistan military, like other militaries 
around the world, conducts operations in conditions that are often described as adverse 
and are further compounded by the compressed time frame available to undertake 
required tasks.  
The procurement tasks range from routine purchases from local markets to items 
of supplies for warfare that are often complex to undertake. The nature and complexity of 
military requirements warrant a niche in the rules and regulations that is adaptable to its 
peculiar requirements.  
The PPRA Rules 2004 lay down broad guidelines, covering the tendering, 
bidding, and arbitration process for procurement that does not cater to the military’s 
specific requirements. Often, the procedure is lengthy and subject to delays due to the 
statutory framework that makes contracting a less potent tool to support the operations 
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and maintenance activities that the military undertakes. The case in point is Rule 40 of 
PPRA Rules 2004, which prohibits negotiations with vendors to secure the best deal. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION  
The primary research question for the thesis seeks to understand the 
circumstances under which financial negotiations should be allowed in the public 
procurement statutory framework in Defense Procurement in Pakistan. 
C. SUBSIDIARY QUESTIONS  
The primary question raises a few other subsidiary questions, which may assist 
the audience to better comprehend the primary research question. Possible questions are 
listed below:  
• What is the impact of limitation on negotiations in the procurement 
process? 
• What is the implications of allowing financial negotiations on the defense 
acquisition process in Pakistan? 
• Can the risks associated with financial negotiations be mitigated? If yes, 
how? 
• Does the acquisition process help develop the operational strategy? 
• Will the procurement system be more responsive to changes in strategy 
and operational preparedness after financial negotiations are permitted? 
• Do negotiations help develop a healthy competition among the suppliers? 
If yes, how? 
• Is the present domain sufficient for securing the best deal for the buyer, or 
does it require expansion? 
D. METHODOLOGY  
To address the primary research question, there is a need to analyze the statutory 
framework that governs the defense procurement practices in the country. Due to the 
peculiar nature of the military organization, a brief explanation of the operational strategy 
helps one understand the fluidity required in the administrative process for defense 
procurement. The thesis also includes a brief overview of the defense commercial market 
to comprehend the market dynamics that prevail in the defense commercial market. 
In the next part of the monograph, three sets of rules and regulations are 
discussed, beginning with the first the procurement regulations in Pakistan. This includes 
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the background to the existing regulations, as well as the national procurement strategy to 
better grasp the future thrusts of statuary framework in Pakistan. A brief analysis of the 
existing framework concludes this part.  
The second set of rules and regulations covers the United Nations Commission for 
International Trade and Law (UNCITRAL) model law for the procurement of goods and 
services. A broad overview of the model law provides the reader with a better 
understanding of the structure of model law. The next section briefly analyzes the 
relevant aspects of the model law. 
The third set of rules and regulations comprise the U.S. laws pertaining to the 
acquisition of goods and services. It briefly covers the history of the procurement 
regulation and the circumstances in which the existing laws were formulated. The salient 
aspects of the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) are also included in this part.  
In the last segment, relevant conclusion are drawn from the discussion in the 
earlier part of the thesis. These conclusions form the basis for the recommendations. The 
recommendations focus on measures that can be incorporated into the existing statuary 
framework for the procurement in Pakistan to make way for negotiations as part of the 
procurement process to make the statutory framework more responsive to the defense 
requirements while ensuring that best procurement practices are followed. 
E. THESIS OVERVIEW  
A major portion of public money is spent on the procurement of goods and 
services for public sector organizations. Efficiency in public sector expenditure is key to 
better governance. The amount of effort and money spent in the acquisition of goods and 
services requires that the stakeholders establish methods and processes to ensure that the 
money spent throughout the process is justified by acquiring the best value for the 
money. 
It is important to understand, from the outset, the terms that are used frequently in 
the monograph. These terms are described below: 
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1. Procurement  
Major public sector expenditure in almost all states is through a system of 
procurement to acquire goods and services for the public at large or any public sector 
organization. The United Nations also declared that public expenditure through 
procurement is the single largest component of the public spending (United States 
Commission on International Law, 2014).  
The term procurement is often used while dealing with the purchase of goods and 
services, but often this term overlaps with acquisition. The Defense Acquisition 
University (DAU) describes the procurement as the “act of buying goods and services for 
the government” (Hagan, 2009).  
Procurement as defined by the UNCITRAL model law for goods, services, and 
works is “the acquisition of goods construction or services by a procuring entity” 
(UNCITRAL Secretariat, 2014). Here, the term acquisition is intended to encompass 
purchase, lease and rental, and hire with or without options to buy. 
2. Acquisition 
Acquisition is defined in the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) of the United 
States of America as follows: 
‘Acquisition’ means the acquiring by contract with appropriated funds of 
supplies or services (including construction) by and for the use of the 
Federal Government through purchase or lease, whether the supplies or 
services are already in existence or must be created, developed, 
demonstrated, and evaluated. Acquisition begins at the point when agency 
needs are established and includes the description of requirements to 
satisfy agency needs, solicitation and selection of sources, award of 
contracts, contract financing, contract performance, contract 
administration, and those technical and management functions directly 
related to the process of fulfilling agency needs by contract. (General 
Services Administration, Department of Defense [GSA DOD], 2005)  
Acquisition is a comprehensive term describing every process to acquire any 
goods or services from its conception until its disposal or utility in the organization. It 
includes conception, product development, contractual modalities usage, and disposal. 
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Procurement, on the other hand, is limited to the purchasing of goods and services and 
does not include the issues related to performance and conclusion of the contract 
Procurement is also restricted to buying goods and services, whereas acquisition 
involves all the stages of the product development. Acquisition includes conception, 
development, production, operation, maintenance, and disposal phases during the life 
cycle of the item (DAU, 2015). The acquisition process covers all aspects of the product; 
it is more relevant to the complex weapon systems that have clearly defined milestones 
and phases. 
The acquisition process is elaborately explained in System Engineering 
Fundamentals, published by the DAU in 2001, as shown in Figure 1. 
 
 Defense Acquisition Process (from DAU, 2001, p. 12) Figure 1. 
3. Acquisition Process 
The formal acquisition process starts with Milestone B where the system 
acquisition and low-rate initial production (LRIP) starts.  
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a. Production and Deployment Phase 
The production and deployment phase enters into the acquisition cycle once the 
successful LRIP test reports are received.  
b. Sustainment and Disposal 
The sustainment and disposal phase is the most cost-heavy stage where mass sale 
production is started and the weapon systems and equipment are deployed. The main 
objective of this phase is to maintain system and equipment in the most cost effective 
manner. This stage also sees the transition from contractor to organic maintenance 
support by the user organization. After outliving its utility, the system is then disposed of 
in accordance with federal laws and classified directives. 
The important thing about this model is that programs can be started at any phase 
of the model, and it depends on user need and fiscal space available for the project. It is 
important for program managers to constantly get in touch with the contractor to achieve 
better quality of the product at the minimum cost. 
It is important to note that procurement in many countries around the world is 
limited to the contracting, whereas all other issues necessary to concluding the successful 
contract are delegated to the organizations that actually require goods and services. The 
procurement process is limited to awarding the contract, leaving most of the issues 
related to the contract to consignee organizations.  
F. NATURE OF MILITARY PROCUREMENT 
The procurement constitutes a big portion of military expenditure and is complex 
due to the nature of requirements. The issue becomes more complex with a huge quantum 
of procurements spanned over multiple years. The nature of procurement, compressed 
time of materialization of contracts, and variation in required quantities due are three 
major factors that define the mechanisms adopted by the defense organization in public 
procurements to achieve the optimum outcome of the process. 
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1. Consideration Factors for Procurement 
Often, the military requires critical equipment/weapon systems that are specific to 
the defense industry and that are not readily available in the commercial market. Because 
the equipment is not readily available in the commercial market, the suppliers of these 
critical equipment/weapon systems are few. In that case, price is not the principal factor; 
instead, the time in which it will become available is more critical. In other cases where 
items are generally available in the market and more suppliers are available, the value of 
money becomes a more critical factor. 
2. Procurement as an Extension of Strategy  
Procurement is also partially dependent on military and political strategy. The 
fluid nature of military strategy may abandon the requirement of items altogether, or it 
may reduce the quantity of items that are required to support a particular operation. These 
items may range from complex weapon systems to services required to support the 
military in any theatre of operation.  
These factors, along with market forces, make procurement difficult to manage. 
The complexities of conflict dynamics and their impact on procurement systems warrant 
an analysis through which a procurement system can be made responsive to the changes 
in the strategy and simultaneously achieve the desired objective of the procurement.  
G. IMPORTANCE OF PROCUREMENT FOR MILITARY 
ORGANIZATIONS 
The military in any state holds a critical and pivotal position in the structure of the 
state. Unlike business organizations where the objectives are definitive and tangible, the 
objectives of military organizations are often intangible, making it difficult to specify the 
outcome. The fundamental issue with the military is used to achieve the policy objective 
of the state (Clausewitz, 1832) that is not as stationary and definitive as policies and 
objectives of business organizations. Often, military outfits are called for in mitigating 
the effects of disasters or a conventional war or, as in the recent past, for the sub-
conventional warfare to flush out insurgents and non-state actors from their territories.  
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H. CATEGORIES OF PROCUREMENT  
There are mainly three categories in which the procurements are carried out. 
These are goods, services, and construction (works); however, only two terms are defined 
explicitly in the UNCITRAL model law for the goods, services, and works 
(construction). The definition of services is embedded in the definition of procurement, 
as described in Article 2 of the model law.  
1. Goods 
In Pakistan, the defense organizations follow guidelines issued through PPRA 
Rules 2004. There are no specific definitions that describe these two major terms. As 
described in Article 2 of the UNCITRAL, goods are defined as 
raw materials, products, equipment and other physical objects of every 
kind and description, whether in solid, liquid or gaseous form, and 
electricity. (United Nations, 2014) 
Goods may also include the finished product or the raw material that may be used 
subsequently to manufacture the final product. This category is mostly procured in terms 
of quantity because it mostly relates to routine items that are used by the military. 
2. Works (Construction) 
United Nations defines construction as quoted below: 
‘Construction’ means all work associated with the construction, 
reconstruction, demolition, repair or renovation of a building, structure or 
works, such as site preparation, excavation, erection, building, installation 
of equipment or materials, decoration and finishing, as well as drilling, 
mapping, satellite photography, seismic investigations and similar 
activities incidental to such work if they are provided pursuant to the 
procurement contract. (United Nations, 2014, p. 3)  
I. CASE FOR THE PAKISTAN MILITARY   
In the recent past, Pakistan has experienced the deployment of its military on all 
three venues. These instances included the operations in the North Western Borders as 
part of sub-conventional warfare since 2004, and as a military standoff between India and 
Pakistan 2001–2002 and 2009–2010. The disastrous earthquake in 2005 was another 
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occasion where massive military deployment was undertaken to rescue people from 
remote areas and provide them shelter and medical facilities. In 2010, the Pakistan Army 
was again at the forefront to provide relief to the people affected due the floods in the two 
major provinces of the country (Punjab and Sindh). These instances provide an insight 
into the environment and circumstances in which the military has to operate in a time-
congested environment to support the humanitarian and disaster relief operations. 
Often, these military engagements are undertaken in an extremely time-
compressed environment where requisite time for buildup may not be available. The 
disaster-relief operation is a classic example of relief operations that are undertaken 
immediately to kick start relief activities. Immediate provision of medical facilities, 
shelter, and food require a responsive backup support plan to achieve the objective. These 
operations are required to be efficient and responsive to mitigate the effects of the natural 
disasters. These disaster relief operations are often slapped with allegations of slow 
response. The military, even if it is able to quickly respond to the emergency with the 
available human and material resources, may not be able to fully achieve the objective to 
help people rebuild and reconstruct the affected areas. Part of the reason is the lack of 
statutory support to initiate the process of rehabilitation in these areas. 
Over the past decade, the military has engaged in sub-conventional warfare on the 
northwestern part of the country (i.e., Federally Administered Tribal Areas [FATA]) 
where the mission is a more complex, multidimensional, and multi-pronged effort than 
conventional war. In addition to defeating the enemy, the objective is expanded to 
resettling the displaced population and rebuilding the infrastructure. These Winning 
Hearts and Minds (WHAM) measures require immediate resumption of the project with a 
definitive deadline to create a positive impact of political and military support to the 
affected community. These tangible objectives require not only the infrastructure but also 
the organizational support of other federal agencies and regulatory bodies.  
J. OVERVIEW OF MILITARY MANAGEMENT IN PAKISTAN 
Pakistan military management system is no different from the rest of the militaries 
around the world. The Pakistan military is generally not involved in vertical integration 
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and relies on the support from the contractors and vendors in achieving the organizational 
objectives. The military regularly enhances its capabilities against security threats by 
improving and replacing the equipment.  
The huge structure of the organization cannot be supported through vertical 
integration, as it would be very expensive to sustain. The contracting support comes in 
handy as a viable option to support military operations. This management style provides 
the opportunity to the military to focus more on operational aspects, and the supporting 
roles are delegated to the vendors.  
It is often a challenge to keep the supporting roles of vendors in pace with 
operational readiness and effectiveness. The management of the vendors becomes very 
important when operating environments are hostile, and contractor support becomes very 
critical to sustaining the operations in such an environment.  
These difficult environments and situations warrant careful handling of this aspect 
to ensure that support elements are part of the operational campaign. Although the 
vendors do not form part of the regular military force, the role that they are assigned 
requires them to be part of the campaign to increase the chances of success of the 
mission.     
K. LOGISTICS AND OPERATIONAL FUNCTIONS AS PART OF 
STRATEGY  
Strategy and tactics provide the scheme for the conduct of military 
operations, logistics the means therefore. Lieutenant Colonel George C. 
Thorpe, USMC. (Naval Supply System Command [NAVSUP], 2014) 
The criticality of operational and logistics amalgamation in any military system is 
of paramount importance. The translation of operational strategy into logistics functions 
is as important as strategy. Logistic and support functions provide the means to achieve 
the desired outcome of the strategy. Therefore, support functions are required to be 
carried out along with the operational strategy. The responsiveness of the logistic and 
support function is an indicator of how well the organization is cohesive for achieving the 
desired objective. 
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Because it is not feasible for the organization to integrate vertically during peace 
times and war, it is deemed appropriate to have a support base activated through 
contractors’ support. Contactors’ support forms part of the logistic functions of the 
military organization.  
Additionally, the uncertainty of material requirement and the limited available 
resources at hand warrants a responsive system that can adapt to changes in the strategy 
and also fulfill the criteria laid down by national regulatory authorities.  
L. PECULIARITIES OF DEFENSE PROCUREMENT 
The demand variability, complexity of the product, development of threats, 
difficulty in cost estimation, and long lead times all add up to uncertainties in the defense 
procurement (Moore, 1964). These uncertainties are not limited to the demand side, but 
are also associated with the supplier side as well.  
These uncertainties have a huge impact on the market and therefore require 
constant renegotiations to ensure that the market is not adversely impacted by 
uncertainties. It is imperative to note here that the sharp distinction between the seller and 
the buyer is obscured in the defense-related market. Often, the buyer, highlighting the 
mixed roles, takes management decisions that are normally taken by the supplier. 
The complete procurement process is a complex issue with two major 
stakeholders (i.e., military and defense contractors/manufacturers). This complex process 
revolves around the idea of optimality desired by both players. 
In fact, defense procurement should be seen in the context of a market structure. 
The prudent way of looking at defense procurement is to analyze the structure of the 
market and the role of the government and the buyer (i.e., military.) The defense market 
is structured by the interest of the two major players. The suppliers, on one extreme, want 
to maximize the profit whereas, the buyer wants the optimal benefit of getting the item at 
the lowest cost to achieve the best value of money (Adams & Adams, 1972).  
The defense procurement market is characterized by only one buyer who has the 
monopsony, but at the same time, the number of suppliers in the market are also very 
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few. Hence, the structure of the market is balanced by oligopoly and monopsony powers. 
The buyer would try to get the lowest price, but the oligopolistic suppliers seldom 
provide the required information to carry out the procurement optimally. The defense 
market with only one buyer and few suppliers provides the suppliers with “shelter 
market,” where the barrier to entry, economies of scale, regulatory mechanisms, and 
government future needs makes it difficult for the procuring agency to consider the factor 
of price only to determine the lowest price (Adams & Adams, 1972, p. 283). 
Because the market is not providing any benchmark for the cost structure of 
required goods, it is extremely difficult to be certain that goods are procured at the lowest 
cost. Although the buyer can hire experts to ascertain the costs, the true cost are difficult 
to identify unless the oligopolistic suppliers are eager to provide that information.  
Despite the fact that there is only one buyer in the market, the oligopolistic 
suppliers mitigate the buyer’s power by collusion and collaborating with each other to 
protect their business interests. The other economic factors, like barriers to entry, high 
production costs, and economies of scale deter other suppliers from entering the market. 
There is one factor of cost insensitivity. Cost insensitivity may arise from the 
change of strategy. Cost insensitivity of the buyer for various goods, including weapon 
systems, put the balance of market in favor of the suppliers who exploit the cost 
insensitivity to their advantage by extracting maximum profits from the buyer. 
The market structure analysis of the defense market reveals that market is not 
perfect. Rather, the oligopolistic suppliers and monopolistic buyer dominate the market 
with divergent interests. The operational strategy and objective of the buyer (in) directly 
affects the market. Both stakeholders enjoy the market power and counterbalance each 
other. 
M. FACTORS AFFECTING THE DEFENSE MARKET  
Before diving deep into defense purchasing (Weidenbaum, 1960, p. 21), it is 
important to comprehend the dynamics of the military market. The four main 
considerations are as follows: 
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• Volatility  
• Technological advancement  
• Long run nature  
• Budgetary controls  
1. Volatility 
The volatility of the military market depends on two major factors. The first deals 
with the civilian economy that has a direct linkage to the military budget. If the economy 
performs better, then there is more room for the military budget, and the situation 
reverses if the economy does not perform well. The second factor relates to the national 
and international security situation, which cannot be forecasted with precision and 
accuracy and hence gives rise to volatility (Weidenbaum, 1960, p. 21).  
The volatility describes the special circumstances in which the military operates 
to undertake the task of national defense, especially in the asymmetric environment 
where the military is required to perform the tasks that do not constitute a full scale or 
limited scale war but rebuilding and reconstruction tasks.  
2. Technological Advancements 
The military is characterized by high performance weapon systems that are 
capable of taking on the enemy. This means that, in order to fully operationalize the 
force, the military has to engage itself constantly in research and development to acquire 
more sophisticated weapon systems (Weidenbaum, 1960, p. 21).  
This operational readiness results in high obsolescence rates of weapon systems 
and requires capital outlays for the acquisition of the improved weapon systems. 
3. Long-Run Nature  
Due to the evolutionary nature of threats posed by both states and non-state 
actors, the up-gradation has become a permanent feature in contemporary militaries 
(Weidenbaum, 1960, p. 21). Often, the acquisition process continues for multiple years to 
fulfill the organizational requirements. Therefore, it does provide some stability to the 
supplier and generates a sort of healthy competition amongst the suppliers.  
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4. Budgetary Control   
The budgetary allocations define the scale and composition of the military 
acquisition (Weidenbaum, 1960, p. 21) rather than of the organizational requirements in 
response to the security situations or the market trends.  
Budgetary outlays often depend on annual economic performance of the country, 
whereas the strategic acquisition often continues for multiple years. This may lead to 
inconsistency in the acquisition program due to variance in the economic performance of 
the country. 
N. CONFIGURATION OF THE DEFENSE MARKET  
Although the configuration of defense procurement generally remains the same, 
there are some peculiar factors that are related only to the defense procurement. These are 
as follows: 
1. Risk-Sharing  
The requirement of defense organizations is often unique. This is due to the 
design and specifications that are relevant to the defense organization (Baron & Besanko, 
1988), and there are therefore very few suppliers, and the market is generally 
oligopolistic. The factor of uniqueness and very few of suppliers suggest that the risk of 
the product that is procured should be distributed among stakeholders. This idea is to 
incentivize suppliers to ensure that the requirement of the organization is met in the 
stipulated time period. 
2. Confidential Information 
Military equipment, due to its confidentiality, there is a longer time period to 
develop the product. Therefore, there is a likelihood that the negotiations are conducted 
for ensuring that the requirement is fully understood, and that research conducted by the 
vendor is conducted in the right direction (Baron & Besanko, 1988). 
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3. Moral Hazard  
Often, the production of the product is complex, owing to the nature and 
confidentiality of the equipment. Therefore, it is very difficult for government officials to 
track down the vendors’ efforts to hold down the costs of production (Baron & Besanko, 
1988). The procurement process needs to be responsive to these complexities and require 
an effective monitoring system to alleviate the effects of the moral hazards. 
4. Cost Monitoring  
The modalities and complexities involved in the entire procurement process, 
especially in the production and delivery of equipment, require effective monitoring 
(Baron & Besanko, 1988). The projects have an inherent problem of cost identification, 
and often the overheads are amalgamated with the special projects. The equipment in 
these projects is either imported or finalized in the special organizations supporting the 
defense services within the country. Therefore, the cost estimation of the contract may be 
different from the actual costs, and perfect monitoring may not be possible. 
Vendors are at an advantageous position from where they can extract more profits 
with comparatively less input costs. Because the schedule of rates (SORs) are outdated 
and monitoring mechanisms in the procuring agencies are generally weak, it is likely that 
procurement agencies are not realizing the best value for money from the products that 
they are procuring and therefore need to be looked into much deeper to optimize the 
value for money.   
O. DEFENSE PROCUREMENT IN PAKISTAN 
Defense procurement is one of the major components of the defense budget. 
Pakistan spends almost 3.54% of the gross domestic product (GDP) as of 2014 (Defense 
Budget—Pakistan, 2014). Pakistan plans to expend almost 22% of the total defense 
budget outlay on procurement. The projected figures for the different areas of 
expenditures are shown in Table 1. 
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Table 1.   Projected Defense Expenditure 2018—Pakistan (from Defense 
Budget—Pakistan, 2014)  
 
Table 1 gives a very well-defined view of the various expenditure heads. The 
trend of expenditure is likely to remain the same, with procurement as one of the major 
expenditures in the defense budget of Pakistan.  
Major procurement of weapon systems and maintenance of existing equipment is 
often through a foreign country and therefore requires a lot of time, deliberations, and due 
diligence before the contract is finalized. Not only is the contract formulation difficult, 
but the successful completion of the contract is also one of the major milestones for the 
procurement agency and its officials. Figure 2 shows total defense budget activity for 
Pakistan including spending on all forces. 
Year Procurement RDT&E O&M Military Personnel Other Total 
2011 2,304.10 254.93 1,632.15 3,989.75 525.31 8,706.24 
2012 1,988.51 247.97 1,666.91 4,370.57 566.37 8,840.33 
2013 1,939.54 250.34 1,750.33 4,299.58 642.88 8,882.67 
2014 1,984.52 260.16 1,775.82 4,502.10 705.10 9,227.70 
2015 1,945.73 264.34 1,858.51 4,601.51 715.13 9,385.22 
2016 1,924.58 273.18 1,962.00 4,776.66 731.89 9,668.31 
2017 1,915.97 281.40 2,041.22 4,985.73 758.51 9,982.83 
2018 1,915.52 284.61 2,101.77 5,170.01 785.23 10,257.14 
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 Total Defense Budget Activity for Pakistan Including Spending on All Figure 2. 
Forces (from Defense Budget—Pakistan, 2014) 
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II. OVERVIEW OF PROCUREMENT RULES AND 
REGULATIONS IN PAKISTAN  
In this chapter, the historical overview gives brief insight into the procurement 
rules and regulations that have been in place in Pakistan. The next section covers the 
background of the World Bank report that initiated the idea of a unified procurement 
regime. It will briefly cover the weak areas and gaps assessed by the World Bank report.  
The next part covers the enacting of the Public Procurement Regularity Authority 
(PPRA) ordinance 2002 and the procurement rules of 2004. A brief overview of relevant 
procurement rules is discussed to provide an understanding of the procurement system in 
Pakistan. The next section covers the prevalent National Procurement Strategy (NPS) that 
provides the future guidelines for the PPRA. It also covers the weakness observed in the 
present procurement regime under PPRA Rules 2004. The last section of this chapter 
analyzes the current procurement system and covers only those topics that are relevant to 
the thesis.  
A. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
Since Pakistan’s independence in 1947, public procurement has been governed by 
different rules and regulations. The main regulatory framework (PPRA, 2013) that was 
adopted for the public procurement includes the following:  
• The Purchase Manual of the defunct Department of Supplies and Disposal, 
which generally covered the purchase of commodities. 
• The West Pakistan Building & Roads Department Code that governs the 
construction of buildings and roads and the hiring of consultants for this 
purpose.  
• The General Financial Rules of the Federal Government and the 
delegation of financial power rules. (PPRA, 2013, p. 1) 
Since 1947, there has been no federal regulatory authority for oversight of the 
public procurement in the country. This deregulated practice led to a host of problems, 
and in 1987/1988, the World Bank carried out the first assessment of the public 
procurement system in Pakistan. It took almost 10 years after the first assessment of the 
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World Bank that the Federal Cabinet announced the establishment of Public Procurement 
Regularity Agency on April 16, 1997 (World Bank, 2000). 
As Pakistan’s infrastructure development was on the rise in the late 1990s, a need 
existed for a streamlined procurement regulatory framework that would better utilize the 
available funds and reduce malpractices.  
The World Bank conducted its first assessment of the procurement system 
prevailing in Pakistan in 1987–1988. As the consequence of this report, the National 
Procurement Reform Program (NPRP) was initiated in 1995 (World Bank, 2000). As per 
the recommendations of phase I of NPRP, the Federal Cabinet of Pakistan approved the 
draft bill for the establishment of the PPRA in principle (World Bank, 2000).  
The World Bank provided the requisite funds for the implementation of phase II 
of NPRP. Before the start of the phase III of the NPRP, the World Bank conducted a 
procurement assessment report in 1999 to assess the procurement regime in Pakistan 
(World Bank, 2000). The report pointed out certain gaps and weak areas that required 
deliberation for the improvement of the procurement system.  
B. WEAKNESSES OBSERVED IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT IN 
PAKISTAN  
The background of the procurement rules in Pakistan provides insight into the 
problems associated with procurement practices in Pakistan (World Bank, 2000). The 
areas highlighted in the report (World Bank, 2000) are explained briefly: 
1. Corruption 
The World Bank viewed the lack of monitoring and oversight in public 
procurement practices. The corruption has deep roots in the procurement system of 
Pakistan, and there was not any visible mechanism to effectively monitor the incidents of 
corruption (World Bank, 2000). 
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2. Human Resource 
The report declared lack of trained human resource as one of the weaknesses 
within the procurement agencies. This also translated into the lack of institutional 
capacity to establish the best procurement practices in the country (World Bank, 2000). 
3. Cost Overruns  
The lack of cohesive framework often delayed the contracts. The World Bank 
estimated that out of 4,500 contracts studied for the report, 3,700 contracts could not be 
concluded due to many shortfalls in the statutory framework, leading to cost overruns 
(World Bank, 2000). 
4. Out of Date Schedule of Rates  
One of the major issues that came under discussion in the report (World Bank, 
2000) was the outdated SORs, which was one of the most critical factors leading to a 
large number of incomplete contracts. Often, the lowest successful bidder and the 
procurement official contested the SORs, and it was impossible to determine the prices of 
a contract, leading to a stalemate (World Bank, 2000). This also led to corrupt practices 
undermining the objective of effective oversight. 
After the implementation of the initiative, the World Bank recommended a 
unified law keeping the UNCITRAL in focus (World Bank, 2000). The World Bank 
recommendations were aimed to reduce corruption, increase transparency, and regulate 
the procurement practices through highly qualified professionals. The report suggested 
that Pakistan adopt the UNCITRAL model.  
One of the key recommendations of the report was the ban on price negotiations 
(World Bank, 2000) to promote transparency. This was done at a time when there was no 
federal regulatory authority to oversee the procurement process in the country. This will 
be discussed subsequently in the paper, as this was translated in the PPRA rules, which 
completely banned the negotiations in Pakistan (PPRA, 2004).  
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C. PUBLIC PROCUREMENT REGULATORY AUTHORITY ORDINANCE 
2002  
These major reasons, summarized in the World Bank report, provided the basis of 
the structure the new PPRA rules. In 2002, in line with the recommendations of the report 
(World Bank, 2000), PPRA Ordinance 2002 was issued, which authorized the 
establishment of a regulatory body to have oversight over the public procurement 
practices in Pakistan. 
It was unprecedented in the history of Pakistan that a federal regulatory body be 
established to oversee public procurement in the country. The PPRA ordinance provided 
the regulatory body with legislative cover, and it started working to establish the rules 
and regulations for the public procurement oversight.  
D. PUBLIC PROCUREMENT REGULATORY AUTHORITY RULES 2004  
In 2004, PPRA rules were formulated, keeping in mind the contents and the 
recommendations of the World Bank Report. Subsequently, there were certain 
amendments to these rules to streamline the rules and regulations.  
The PPRA is not involved in the procurement process but restricts itself to issuing 
policy directives. The procuring agencies carry out procurement independently under the 
policy guidelines of the PPRA. The PPRA performs its functions as a regulator rather 
than a participant in the procurement process and provides the check against any 
malpractice. 
E. SALIENT FEATURES OF PUBLIC PROCUREMENT REGULATORY 
AUTHORITY ESTABLISHMENT AND RULES  
1. Composition 
The board was composed in the light of PPRA Rules 2004 (Government of 
Pakistan, 2004), and it governs the functioning of the PPRA as a federal regulatory body. 
The detailed composition of the board is quoted below:  
• Secretary, Finance Division Chairperson 
• Secretary, Ministry of Industries and Production Member 
• Secretary, Defense Production Division Member 
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• Secretary, Ministry of Water and Power Member 
• Secretary, Ministry of Housing and Works Member 
• Secretary, Ministry of Communications Member 
• Three Private Members Member 
• (To be nominated by Federal Government) 
• Managing Director (Government of Pakistan, 2002, p. 3) 
The board is composed of stakeholders who carry out public procurement in their 
respective departments. The independence of the PPRA is undermined with this structure 
of the board and is discussed in the later part of this chapter.  
2. Functions and Powers of Authority 
The PPRA is empowered to ensure better governance, superior management, 
increased transparency and accountability, and better quality of public procurement 
goods, services, and works. These powers, when translated into tangible actions, drive the 
functional form of the authority. The functions of the authority are quoted below: 
• Monitor applications of rules, laws, and regulations  
• Evaluate rules, laws, and regulations procedures relating to inspection or 
quality of goods, and recommend reformulation 
• Recommend to the federal government the formulation of new laws, rules, 
and policies  
• Make regulations; lay down rules, codes of ethics, and procedures for 
public procurement; and inspection quality of goods, services, and works 
• Monitor public procurement practices and make recommendations to 
improve governance, transparency, accountability, and quality of public 
procurement 
• Monitor overall performance of procurement agencies and recommend 
improvements 
• Provide and coordinate assistance to procurement agencies in developing 
and improving institutional framework (Government of Pakistan, 2002, p. 
2) 
F. SALIENT FEATURES OF PUBLIC PROCUREMENT REGULATORY 
AUTHORITY RULES  
PPRA rules cover various administrative and technical aspects of the procurement 
process. Only the salient features of PPRA rules relevant to thesis are discussed below:  
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1. Procurement Planning  
Rule 8 binds procuring agencies to develop a mechanism to plan the procurement 
by realistically determining the requirement of an agency and determining its future 
benefits. This aims to reduce the “adhoc” or “urgent” procurement that may result in 
costly procurement and may not be achieving the best value for public money spent. 
2. Approval Mechanism 
Rule 11 requires the procuring agencies to authorize clearly and delegate powers 
of procurement to undertake various categories of procurement (Government of Pakistan, 
2004). This is an administrative action that focuses on the agility and responsiveness of 
the organizations at different levels of procurement. It aims to enhance the efficiency of 
the organizations to speedily carry out the purchases.    
3. Qualification of Suppliers and Contractors  
Rule 17 provides procurement agencies with powers to get information from 
suppliers and contractors regarding the capacities of their financial, technical, 
professional, legal, or managerial expertise, irrespective of whether they have been pre-
qualified (Government of Pakistan, 2004). But to do so, the agency should have credible 
reasons or evidence of defect in the above-mentioned capabilities of the suppliers and 
contractors. 
4. Methods of Procurement  
Rule 20 declares open competitive bidding as the principal method of 
procurement (Government of Pakistan, 2004). Further to this, Rule 36 lays down the 
procedure for the open competitive bidding, with single stage and two-stage processes.  
5. Limitation on Negotiations  
Rule 40 restricts any negotiations with bidders after the submission of the lowest 
evaluated bid or with any other bidder (Government of Pakistan, 2004).  
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6. Alternative Method of Procurement  
Rule 42 does provide some alternatives to the principal method of procurement. It 
explains various methodologies that are applicable for different situations (Government 
of Pakistan, 2004). It briefly describes three alternative methods of procurement (e.g., 
petty purchases, request for tendering, direct contracting, and negotiated tendering).   
7. Redress of Grievances and Settlement of Disputes 
Rule 48 and 49 provides the policy for the redress of grievances and disputes that 
may arise during management of the contract or during the bidding process (Government 
of Pakistan, 2004). These provide an opportunity for bidders to lodge a complaint during 
the process of procurement to the committee to be formed by the procuring agency. The 
bidder has the option to approach the court of jurisdiction in case he or she is not satisfied 
with the committee’s arbitration decision. 
G. FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR THE PUBLIC PROCUREMENT 
REGULATORY AUTHORITY  
1. PPRA National Procurement Strategy  
In 2013, the PPRA published a document regarding national procurement strategy 
that stated the fundamentals of the PPRA procurement strategy. The cornerstones of the 
procurement strategy are as follows:  
2. Fairness 
The PPRA requires that the procurement officials provide a level playing field to 
suppliers to ensure that equal chance is provided to minimize any discrimination. This is 
applicable to address the grievances where the stakeholders can present their cases to get 
justice.  
3. Transparency 
It requires the processes to be transparent so that all the stakeholders have equal 
access to the processes and documents. Procurement officials should provide equal 
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opportunity to stakeholders so that they have an access to all the processes of the 
procurement.  
4. Efficiency 
Efficiency requires the conclusion of the procurement process within a reasonable 
and stipulated time. One of the gray areas of the PPRA is that it cannot ensure timely 
completion of the procurement. PPRA rules do not specify any timeline for each step of 
the procurement that enhances inefficiency by the procurement agencies.  
5. Accountability  
Accountability of the procuring agencies and the procurement officials is one key 
area where there is a room for improvement. Accountability has an indirect effect on all 
cornerstones of the procurement strategy of the PPRA. The lack of effective mechanisms 
to carry out the accountability of the procurement agencies and its officials had adverse 
effects on the efficiency and the timely completion of the contracts.  
The accountability mechanism is limited only to auditing the documents. The 
conduct of the agency and its officials that ensures that all the cardinal principles are 
followed is absent. 
These principles do provide food for thought in establishing the procurement 
process that is more responsive for all the stakeholders (e.g., users and suppliers). The 
idea of efficiency and transparency provides the guidelines for getting the best value for 
money expended on procurement of goods and services, as well as the administration of 
contracts for procurement.  
Although the objectives laid out in the National Procurement Strategy 2013–2016 
are subjective to quantify, the concept of procurement efficiency (CERP, 2013) can be 
deduced from this strategy that can provide the overall framework for the procurement 
process. The procurement efficiency is difficult to measure, but it can help develop a 
framework where these principles can be used cohesively to improve both the process 
efficiencies and the outcome of the processes. 
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H. WEAKNESSES IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT REGULATORY 
AUTHORITY RULES 2004  
After the promulgation of the PPRA Rules 2004, certain areas were identified to 
improve the efficiency of the PPRA. As a result of discussions with independent donor 
agencies and feedback of the procurement agencies, a national procurement strategy was 
devised to fill the gaps observed during the implementation of these rules. 
The National Procurement Strategy (NPS) provides insight into the weaknesses 
observed in the procurement mechanisms. It also suggests recommendations to improve 
public procurement. United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 
provided the requisite support to undertake the study for improving efficiency of the 
PPRA (PPRA, 2013). The focal points in NPS are as follows:  
1. Legal Framework 
Legal framework (PPRA, 2013) aims to improve transparency, efficiency, and 
accountability. It also highlights certain areas that require further reinforcements, like 
procurement law, policies, and procedures that form the backbone of the legal 
framework. 
The NPS highlights the fact that existing sets of rules and regulations need 
elaboration to enhance efficiency of procurement entities. There is a requirement to 
provide detailed explanations to guide the procurement agencies for uniform 
comprehension. 
One pertinent example is assessing the value for money (PPRA, 2013). No 
guidelines are provided to assess the value for money; therefore, there is difference of 
comprehension of this important aspect. Another important aspect is the imposition of 
penalties on the collusive practices undertaken by suppliers (PPRA, 2013). The rules do 
not specify methodologies for implementation of these penalties. The deficiency of 
guidelines results in inefficiencies in the procurement system and therefore requires 
legislative and institutional mechanisms for removing these inefficiencies. 
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The strategy document emphasized filling the gaps on priority so as to have a 
sound legal base to implement further reforms in the public procurement regime in 
Pakistan (PPRA, 2013).  
2. Institutional Arrangements 
The monograph focuses the institutional capacity of the PPRA and procurement 
agencies (PPRA, 2013) and opines that there is a need to improve the capacity of these 
institutions to effectively implement the procurement laws, rules, and regulations. The 
strategy document recommends enhancing the human resource capacity of the institutions 
involved in the public procurement, and also recommends that procurement professionals 
cadre to deal with public procurement (PPRA, 2013).  
3. Monitoring and Oversight  
The monograph acknowledges that effective monitoring and oversight is lacking 
and, therefore, effectiveness cannot be achieved. The procurement agencies, as well as 
the PPRA, lack the requisite data and information to monitor procurement activities 
effectively.  
The monograph recommends establishment of mechanisms for provision of 
information to all stakeholders on procurement activities (PPRA, 2013). It also 
recommends improving the external and internal controls of procuring agencies through 
modified audit systems that take into account not only the financial aspects but also the 
performance and compliance aspects of the procuring agencies (PPRA, 2013).   
4. Capacity Building of Procuring Agencies and Suppliers 
One key area that has been identified in the strategy paper is enhancing the 
capacities of the two major stakeholders (i.e., human resource of the procuring agencies 
and suppliers).  
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I. ANALYSIS  
1. Composition and Powers of the Public Procurement Regulatory 
 Authority  
The PPRA is a regulatory body that streamlines and monitors the public 
procurement activity within Pakistan. An apparent conflict of interest is visible in the 
composition of the board because the members of the board are also the principal 
accounting officers of respective ministries. There are 10 members, of which three are 
private members who are appointed by the federal government (Government of Pakistan, 
2002), and the rest of the members are secretaries of the various ministries that undertake 
public procurement. They are simultaneously regulating the PPRA board and overseeing 
their ministries (PPRA, 2013). The problems are further aggravated due to the lack of 
particular criteria to appoint private members. Moreover, as per paragraph 4 of PPRA 
ordinance 2002, the federal government can issue policy directive that is binding on the 
PPRA. 
The federal government has a strong influence over the PPRA that is supposed to 
be an independent regulatory body. The PPRA depends on the federal government for 
annual grants that further compromise its independence (Government of Pakistan, 2002). 
2. Value for Money  
PPRA rules (PPRA, 2004, p. 2) define value for money incorporating different 
aspects of procurement. The following aspects take part in evaluating the value of money: 
• Quality 
• Timeliness reliability  
• After sales service  
• Upgradeability 
• Price source 
• The combination of whole life cost and quality to meet the procuring 
agency’s requirement 
This is an important explanation with regards to ascertaining the best return for 
the money spent, which defines what the best return of the value will be. 
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In this context, it is important to highlight two relevant issues. As highlighted 
Penny Jackson in his 2012 article, it is of prime importance that value for money is 
comprehended in a complete spectrum. The three cardinal principles to understand the 
value for money concepts are economy, efficiency and effectiveness. These are defined 
below:  
Economy: Reducing cost of resources used for an activity, with a regard 
for maintaining quality; Efficiency: Increasing output for a given input, or 
minimizing input for a given output, with a regard for maintaining quality; 
Effectiveness: Successfully achieving the intended outcomes from an 
activity. (Jackson, 2012, p. 1)  
These three elements combine to form a perfect balance to achieve the best return 
for money. But it is extremely difficult to assess the value for money because there is 
lack of reliable data available with the procuring agency and the PPRA, which can 
accurately assess the value for money in a particular case and time. 
But an equally important question arises regarding the assessment of the value of 
money: for whom is it assessed (Jackson, 2012)? Is it the procuring agency or the PPRA? 
If this question were analyzed by the agency, it would provide a different answer and 
may not be congruent with what the PPRA assumes is correct. Therefore, it is difficult for 
these agencies to agree on one correct answer. The same question has been raised in the 
national procurement strategies that emphasize the need to provide guidance on the issues 
of assessing the value for money (PPRA, 2013).  
It is pertinent to mention here that the procuring agency has to look after not only 
the procurement aspect but also the operational aspects to optimize the output of the 
organization. The PPRA, however, restricts itself to the procurement domain and may not 
grasp the complete spectrum as conceived by the procurement agency.  
There are two important questions that need to be asked to streamline the 
direction of the procurement activity. The comprehension of value for money that is 
acceptable at all levels and methodology adopted to evaluate the value for money in a 
specific situation.  
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Because PPRA rules generically cover the bidding and tendering aspects of the 
procurement process, every public sector procurement agency uses different 
methodologies and procedures to carry out public procurement.  
To accrue the benefits of harmonized procurement regulatory framework, it 
would be necessary to address the policy issues for each sector individually to provide 
them with a guideline to carry out procurement in the respective agencies.  
3. Transparency 
Transparency has been one of the cornerstones of the PPRA rules whereby the 
procuring agencies are required to perform all the tasks in a transparent manner. This 
transparency leads to efficiency and effectiveness, as discussed above. As explained in 
the NPS, transparency translates into open access to public documents, including 
information regarding procurement planning. 
The results, however, are not encouraging. The U.S. Department of State report 
on investment climate in 2012 identified key issues:  
Inadequate bidding documents, inadequate response time for bidders, 
prequalification as a means of restricting competition, flaws in price 
negotiations, lack of an independent complaints’ handling process, and 
irregularities in inspections and measurements. 
The Government of Pakistan, in collaboration with partners like World Bank and 
Asian Development Bank, prepared a report (Government of Pakistan, 2009) on the 
procurement assessment and transparency index was at the lowest with score of 1.52 in 
the public procurement system (Government of Pakistan, 2009). 
Transparency is a functional requirement that needs to be applied to all 
stakeholders so that an overall objective of economy and efficiency is achieved 
simultaneously. But because PPRA rules focus on one stakeholder (i.e., procuring 
agencies and the suppliers), another major stakeholder has remained out of focus of 
PPRA regulations. 
PPRA regulations have greatly emphasized the aspect of transparency through 
rules that are binding on the procurement agency but which do not put any binding 
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regulations for the suppliers who provide them greater maneuverability in the 
procurement process.  
Moreover, the procuring agencies do not have the institutional capacity to 
investigate any wrongdoing or collusive behavior of suppliers during the procurement 
process. Although collusive behavior, once identified, can be brought under scrutiny, it is 
time consuming and may hinder the procurement process.  
PPRA regulations do not cover the aspects of contract management and have left 
the discretion to procuring agencies to administer the contract under their own 
administrative arrangements. 
J. GOVERNANCE AS A FUNCTION OF THE PUBLIC PROCUREMENT 
REGULATORY AUTHORITY  
Although greatly influenced by UNCITRAL model law on procurement, PPRA 
rules, unlike the UNCITRAL model law, have included improving governance as one of 
the main objectives of authority. The governance, however, is a broad term that has come 
into the domain of public procurement due to the increased complexity in the 
procurement sector. For easy and better comprehension, the term governance has been 
restricted to public governance. As described by Shakya (2012), practices of public 
procurement are constructed on some cardinal principles that include accountability, 
ethics, impartiality, professionalism, service, and transparency.  
These fundamental principles form part of the governance framework in the 
public procurement sector. These principles develop linkages with rules and regulations 
that are in place for better procurement practices. All stakeholders are made accountable 
for their actions so that the processes, procedures, and legal framework all lead to an 
optimum outcome.  
Estimated public procurement accounts for 15% spending of the world’s GDP 
(PPRA, 2013), and developing countries like Pakistan have even more chunk dedicated to 
the public procurement sector. The effective regulatory framework will definitely have an 
impact on overall governance in the country. PPRA rules (Government of Pakistan, 
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2004), however, restrict them strictly to the tendering and bidding and arbitration domain 
and do not establish it into ensuring that stakeholders follow the best practices. 
It is appropriate to take into account the fact that stakeholders in public 
procurement are not only the buyers and the public, but the seller as well. Because the 
supplier is one of the beneficiaries of the outcome of the public procurement process, the 
supplier also needs to be taken into the loop of governance to ensure that equality 
transparency ethics are applied equally to all the stakeholders to achieve optimum results. 
K. MONITORING MECHANISM PUBLIC PROCUREMENT 
REGULATORY AUTHORITY  
The envisaged functions of the PPRA (Government of Pakistan, 2002) include the 
monitoring of procurement practices conducted by procuring agencies. The existing 
capacity of the PPRA has not moved beyond the advisory role that the PPRA has played 
over the years since its inception. The advisory role is also limited, mostly to tendering 
documents. 
The PPRA has allowed procurement agencies to use their discretion in developing 
their own procurement manuals to undertake public procurement. This is in line with the 
recommendation of World Bank (2000); however, the institutional capacity does not 
match with objectives that were set forth for the PPRA (Government of Pakistan, 2002).  
The concept of decentralization was applied in light of the recommendations of 
the World Bank (2000). The procuring agency is kept independent to carry out the 
procurement within the domain provided by law, but an overarching organizational 
instrument is absent in observing deviations during all the phases of contract 
administration. The World Bank (2000) in its report recommended that new procurement 
laws should deal only with the policy making and law, not the line function; however, 
PPRA ordinance envisages the authority to monitor the procurement practices.  
The PPRA does not have appropriate institutional capacity to have an oversight 
over procurement agencies (PPRA, 2013). This lack of capacity translates its effect into 
every sphere of the public procurement process.  
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In addition to monitoring and oversight by the PPRA, procuring agencies do 
undergo audits of the procurement financials, but they do not go under scrutiny if they 
achieved the optimum results by application of the procurement law during the 
procurement of goods, services, and works. The Auditor General of Pakistan, who is 
responsible for auditing the public expenditure in the country, only audits the financial 
aspect of procurements. Therefore, the PPRA is unable to have an effective oversight 
over the procurement agencies to implement the procurement law in its true letter and 
spirit. 
The NPS document also envisages an enhanced role for auditors to conduct the 
audit of the procurements and of the performance of procuring agencies, and also to 
assess the validity of value for money assessments (PPRA, 2013). 
L. NEGOTIATIONS UNDER PUBLIC PROCUREMENT REGULATORY 
AUTHORITY RULES  
PPRA Rule 40 (Government of Pakistan, 2004) explicitly limits the negotiations 
with the lowest evaluated bidder or any other bidder after submission of bid. Before 
going into the merits and demerits of the allowing negotiation in a procurement 
framework, it is appropriate to understand the context under which PPRA rules 
(Government of Pakistan, 2004) were formulated. 
The World Bank (2003) in its procurement assessment report pointed out the 
tendency by procurement officials to negotiate the price after bid opening that invites 
more corruption. However, another important aspect of the procurement process is to 
achieve best value for money, and it may conflict with the limitation on the negotiations 
described in Rule 40. 
The problem of corruption highlighted in the report (World Bank, 2000) was 
primarily due to lack of oversight by any central regulatory authority that can have a 
check on the procurement agency and provide an alternative forum where grievances 
against malpractice can be addressed.  
 34 
The central regularity authority is in place after the establishment of the PPRA for 
oversight over the procurement practices in the public sector and therefore can curb the 
tendency of corruption through effective management techniques and procedures. 
The idea of value for money pushes public sector procurement agencies to use 
every means available to them to ensure that the money spent produces optimum results. 
The optimum outcome, as described in the PPRA rules (Government of Pakistan, 2004), 
includes a complete spectrum, including quality, timeliness after sales, service 
upgradability, price, and combination of whole life cost.  
Price is just one factor that is linked directly or indirectly to all other aspects of 
assessing the value for money. Because financial negotiations are not allowed in PPRA 
rules, the value for money concept loses its utility. The value for money concept gives an 
idea of how to regulate different aspects of public procurement so that not only can one 
achieve transparency, but also uphold the efficiency and effectiveness of system.  
In developed countries like the United States and United Kingdom, robust 
oversight mechanisms are placed to ensure that all stakeholders work within their 
domains and achieve optimum results through efficiency and effectiveness.  
M. CONCLUSION  
In this chapter, the historical overview of the procurement regulatory framework 
gave the requisite background of the procurement regime in Pakistan. It also discussed 
the establishment, function, and composition of the PPRA. It also highlighted certain 
rules and regulations that are relevant to the thesis research question. The NPS covers the 
future direction that PPRA envisages. Analysis of PPRA rules comprises the final section 
of the chapter, highlighting issues that are relevant to improve the procurement regime in 
Pakistan.   
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III. UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION FOR INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE AND LAW MODEL LAW ON PROCUREMENT 
In this chapter, the evolution of the United Nations Commission for International 
Trade and Law (UNCITRAL) model law on procurement is discussed. In the initial part 
of the chapter, the historical evolution of the model law is discussed. The mandate, 
composition, and working methodology of UNCITRAL constitute the next part of the 
chapter. 
A brief summary of each chapter of model law is included in addition to the 
analysis which covers only the relevant aspects of model law that relate to the thesis 
research question.  
A. HISTORY AND ESTABLISHMENT OF UNCITRAL 
The UNCITRAL finds its origin in the UN general assembly resolution 2205 
(XXI) of December 17, 1966 (UNCITRAL, 2011). Increasing problems in international 
trade paved the way for a unified global regulatory framework to streamline the trade 
issues within different states (UNCITRAL, 2011). 
The United Nations, in pursuance of Article 13 of United Nations Charter (United 
Nations, 2015) assigned the responsibility to the Secretary General of the United Nations 
for formulating a paper to devise a mechanism for the unified legal framework for 
procurement (UNCITRAL, 2011).  
This paper was presented in the 20th session of the General Assembly, and a 
proposal was initiated to form a commission to harmonize issues affecting international 
trade. The secretary general of the United Nations was requested to highlight key areas 
that were required to be focused. The report was submitted in 1965 (Cohen, 2011) and is 
referred to as the Schmitt Hoff report. 
In the aftermath of the report, a commission was established with its primary 
focus to further harmonize and modernize international trade by adopting the legislative 
and non-legislative instruments in different areas of commercial law. The associated 
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areas with the international trade were identified as dispute resolution, international 
contract practices, insolvency, transport, international payments, procurement, and sale of 
goods (UNCITRAL, 2011).  
B. MANDATE 
The commission was entrusted to provide the mechanism for progressive 
harmonization of international trade (UNCITRAL, 2004). The commission provided a 
forum to harmonize the technical and administrative issues that may arise in international 
trade due to adoption of different systems by different states. Therefore, the mandate 
generally focuses on the issues that promote international trade. The mandate of the 
UNCITRAL is as follows: 
Coordinating the work of organizations active in this field and 
encouraging cooperation among them 
Promoting wider participation in existing international conventions and 
wider acceptance of existing model and uniform laws 
Preparing or promoting the adoption of new international conventions, 
model laws and uniform laws and promoting the codification and wider 
acceptance of international trade terms, provisions, customs and practices, 
in collaboration, where appropriate, with the organizations operating in 
this field 
Promoting ways and means of ensuring a uniform interpretation and of 
international conventions and uniform laws in the field of the law of 
international trade 
Collecting and disseminating information on national legislation and 
modern legal developments, including case law, in the field of the law of 
international trade 
Establishing and maintaining a close collaboration with the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
Maintaining liaison with other United Nations organs and specialized 
agencies concerned with international trade 
Taking any other action it may deem useful to fulfill its functions. 
(UNCITRAL Secretariat, 2013) 
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C. COMPOSITION 
The commission is headed by a chairperson, who is aided by three vice 
chairpersons, a rapporteur, and a bureau of commission for the plenary annual session. 
The member states elect the bureau of commission, and there are currently 60 member 
states elected for a period of six years (UNCITRAL, 2007).  
The UNCITRAL has been composed in a manner to represent all geographic 
regions, and economic and legal systems for its enhanced output. It is composed of 60 
member states that include 14 states from Africa, 14 states from Asia, eight states from 
Eastern Europe, 10 states from Latin America and the Caribbean, and 14 states from 
Western Europe (UNCITRAL Secretariat, 2013). The UNCITRAL operates through 
working groups (United Nations, 1969) who present their works in the annual plenary 
session held once a year.  
D. UNCITRAL SECRETARIAT  
The International Trade Law division of the office of Legal Affairs of the United 
Nations Secretariat performs the duties as the secretariat for the commission. Initially, the 
division was located in New York, but it moved to Vienna in 1979. It includes lawyers 
from various countries and legal traditions. The director of the division serves as the 
secretary of the comission. 
E. WORKING METHODOLOGY  
UNCITRAL secretariat takes a variety of diffferent tasks, which include the 
following:  
• Prepartions of study  
• Reports and drafts of texts on topics that are being cnsidered for future 
inclusion in working programme  
• Legal research  
• Drafting and revision of working papers  
• Reporting on working groups and commission meetings  
• Administrative services to the working groups (UNCITRAL Secretariat, 
2013, p. 9) 
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In addition, the secretariat assists the commission in cocrdinating the work of  
other organizations in the broader United Nations framework (UNCITRAL Secretariat, 
2013). 
F. WORK PROGRAM 
In 1968, after due deliberations, the commission adopted nine work areas, which 
included international trade of goods, commercial arbitrations, transportation, insurance, 
international payments, intellectual property, elimination of discrimination in laws 
affecting international trade, and legalization of documents (UNCITRAL Secretariat, 
2013). 
However, this is not the final list of subjects that the commission considers. The 
work program changes according to the needs of the time. Likewise, there are some 
issues that the commission has not addressed, such as insurance (UNCITRAL Secretariat, 
2013). On the other hand, there are certain subjects, like procurment, electronic 
commerce, security interests, online dispute resolution, and microfinance that has been 
added subsequently (UNCITRAL Secretariat, 2013). 
G. TASK REGULATION OF THE UNCITRAL  
The UNCITRAL regulates its tasks through working groups. There are six 
working groups who work on the assigned projects for a specific time period. Working 
group I dealt with the procurement laws for the period between 2004 and 2012; working 
group VI is dealing with security interests since 2002. The recommendations of the 
working groups are discussed in the annual session of the commission, and 
recommendations are discussed at length before being put into the document 
(UNCITRAL Secretariat, 2013).  
H. UNCITRAL OUTCOMES 
The commission uses three different techniques that describe its outcome of the 
discussions and reserch work. They are as follows:  
• Legislative technique  
• Contractual technique  
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• Explanatory technique (UNCITRAL Secretariat, 2013) 
The model law, which will be discussed in detail, forms part of the legislative 
technique that provides guidelines to the member states for adoption in their respective 
states and is not binding. 
I. UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON PROCUREMENT OF GOODS, 
CONSTRUCTION, AND SERVICES, 1994 
Keeping mandate as the focal point, the UNCITRAL worked for establishing a 
global law that is able to harmonize the public procurement in different states around the 
world promoting the international trade. The UNCITRAL, since its inception, has formed 
laws as a guide for member states. The rules formulated by the UNCITRAL are not 
binding on the member states. These include model law on international arbitration 
(1985), model law for the international credit transfers (1992), and the model law for 
procurement of goods, construction, and services (1994) (UNCITRAL, 2007). 
The UNCITRAL adopted the model law for procurement of goods, construction, 
and services (hereinafter referred to as the “model law”) in the 26th session held in 
Vienna (International Legal Materials, 1994).  
The model law was aimed at serving as a model for the states with outdated 
procurement regulations in order to have streamlined international trade. Another 
objective was to obtain better value in return for the expenditure of public funds 
(International Legal Materials, 1994).  
The model law set forth guidelines for the countries to adopt a regulatory 
framework that is supplemented though the regulations specific to each country. Unlike 
the convention, the model law provides a guideline, and the option to adopt the model 
law provisions rests with the state. The model law provides the option and mechanism 
that can be used by any member state to regulate the procurement system in the country. 
Its inherent flexibility provides an opportunity for the states to handle the 
increasingly complex issues of private commercial trade in the highly competitive global 
market (Cohen, 2011). The model law provides the stable platform for smooth processing 
of commercial trade. The UNCITRAL not only provides the model law for the states to 
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follow, keeping their environment in focus, but also supports the legal issues that may 
arise from the trade. One glaring example is of the arbitration law of 1985 that provides 
the guidelines to solve the contentious issues amongst the stakeholders in any commercial 
trade. 
The increasing complexity and advancement in technology persuaded member 
states to pursue the case for the updating the model law in 1994. In the 36th session of the 
commission, the discussions started to add in new regulations in the 1994 model law 
(UNCITRAL, 2007). The progressions in the technology and emerging procurement 
practices led the commission to focus on the following: 
• Publication of contract opportunities  
• Publication of the laws and regulations governing procurement contracts  
• Publication of solicitation documents and related information  
• Publication of contract awards  
• Use of electronic communications in the procurement process  
• Electronic (reverse) auctions  
• Electronic catalogues (UNCITRAL, 2007, pp. 1109) 
After deliberate discussions, the model law was revised in 2011 with some 
addition to the framework agreements and electronic reverse auctions. 
J. UPDATING THE MODEL LAW OF 1994 
The advancement in technology and new practices envisaged in public 
procurement led to review of 1994 model law. The cost effective and efficient methods 
were introduced in the revised model law which was released in year 2011. 
The two major inclusions, other than the minor additions, were the electronic 
reverse auctions and the framework agreements (UNCITRAL Secretariat, 2014) that are 
discussed in the subsequent section.  
K. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF MODEL LAW 2011 
The model law is composed of eight chapters. The following text briefly 
summarizes the contents of the various chapters of the model law. 
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1. Chapter I 
This chapter includes 26 articles. The provisions in this chapter recognize how the 
objectives given in the preamble are implemented by regulating procurement. It includes 
the requirement of the institutional and administrative necessities, such as the issue of 
regulations and the maintenance of documentary records, which are essential for 
regulating the procurement regime as intended. (UNCITRAL Secretariat, 2014). 
2. Chapter II 
This chapter contains two sections and includes articles 27–35. Section I is 
composed of the regulations concerning the selection/award phase of the procurement 
process (i.e., the procurement method). The two notable additions are the inclusions of 
conditions for use in electronic reverse auctions, and the framework agreement as 
described in articles 31 and 32. Section II covers provisions related to manner of 
solicitation for each procurement method. This section constitute articles 32–35 
(UNCITRAL Secretariat, 2014).  
The next portions until Chapter VII provide the details of the procedures to be 
adopted in carrying out procurement. These regulations provide a broad framework for 
conducting the procurement to ensure that best practices are followed during the 
procurement process (UNCITRAL, Secretariat 2014).  
3. Chapter III 
This chapter constitute articles 36–44 and is composed of three sections. The 
chapter lays out the procedure for the most widely used methods of tendering (i.e., open 
tendering). This chapter includes the methods and conditions applicable in open 
tendering. It covers the modalities of solicitation of the tenders, method of opening these 
tenders, and the issues related to open tendering (UNCITRAL, Secretariat 2014). 
In section I, articles 36–39 provide the guidelines for the procuring entity to adopt 
a uniform method of inviting a tender and describe the methodology for its adoption. 
Section II, which constitutes articles 40–41, provides the methodology for submitting the 
tender to the procuring entity. It also provides the methodology and conditions under 
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which a supplier can withdraw his or her tender that has been submitted earlier 
(UNCITRAL Secretariat, 2014).  
Section III consists of articles 42–44 and provides the guidelines for the 
evaluation of the tenders that have been submitted by suppliers. It sets out the conditions 
under which the tenders should be opened and the methodologies to be adopted in 
making the process more transparent. It also requires the proceedings to be recorded in 
vide article 25 of the law (UNCITRAL Secretariat, 2014). 
4. Chapter IV 
This chapter consists of articles 45–47 and sets out the procedure for the methods 
of restricted tendering. It provides the detailed methodology to be adopted in case of 
restricted tendering (UNCITRAL Secretariat, 2014). 
5. Chapter V  
The chapter consists of articles 48–52 and provides the framework for a more 
complex two-stage tendering process with the inclusion of competitive negotiations. The 
framework for conducting the competitive negotiations and the consecutive negotiations 
are also provided to streamline the issue during the process of procurement. The chapter 
covers in detail the methods that must be adopted while conducting alternative methods 
(UNCITRAL Secretariat, 2014) of procurement (other than open tendering), which are as 
follows: 
• Request for proposal with dialogue 
• Request for proposal with consecutive negotiations 
• Single-source procurement 
Article 48 deals with two-stage tendering, whereas article 49 deals with a request 
for a proposal with dialogue. Articles 50 and 51 provide the methods for request for a 
proposal with consecutive negotiations (UNCITRAL Secretariat, 2014). It is pertinent to 
mention here that article 51 prohibits any further negotiations after receiving the final or 
best offer from the suppliers (UNCITRAL Secretariat, 2014).  
Article 52 lays down the methodology for the single-source procurement with a 
cross-reference to article 34, and it requires the procuring agency to continuously engage 
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in negotiations with the suppliers unless it becomes unfeasible to continue negotiations 
(UNCITRAL Secretariat, 2014).  
6. Chapter VI 
This chapter consists of the new provisions, articles 53–57, which were 
previously not included in the first version of the model law in 1994. The electronic 
reverse auction is aimed at providing the methodology for maximum participation by the 
suppliers and also as an economical method in relation to the cost and time of the 
procuring entity (UNCITRAL Secretariat, 2014). 
Article 53 provides the provision for the electronic reverse auction as a method 
for procurement. It lays down the procedure that is required to be adopted; procurement 
is based solely on this method. Because the method is electronic, the provisions require 
the buyer to provide the requisite forum to communicate with suppliers for clarifications 
(UNCITRAL Secretariat, 2014).  
Article 54 deals with provisions when electronic reverse auction is used as a 
phase prior to contract award. Articles 55 and 56 deal with the timings and the evaluation 
criteria (i.e., price and other related aspects) that are kept as baseline for awarding the 
contract in articles 53 and 54. Article 57 provides the procedural safeguard to ensure that 
the extremely low or unresponsive bidders do not subvert proceedings (UNCITRAL 
Secretariat, 2014). 
7. Chapter VII 
This chapter consists of articles 58–63 and deals with the framework agreements 
that provide a hedge against any future requirement with no definite quantity and time. 
These procedures and practices are followed around the globe with generally the same 
mechanisms with different names like indefinite delivery indefinite quantity (IDIQ), task 
order contracts, catalogue contracts, and umbrella contracts. This component of the law 
provides the mechanism to undertake these agreements (UNCITRAL Secretariat, 2014). 
This method is a new inclusion in the model law. It is more suited for the 
contracts that are required on a repetitive or urgent basis and are not complex in 
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execution (UNCITRAL, 2011). Articles 58 and 59 deal with the close framework 
agreement. Articles 60 and 61 specify provisions for establishment and methodologies to 
adopt open framework agreement. Article 63 explicitly prohibits any changes to the 
framework agreement after it has been awarded (UNCITRAL Secretariat, 2014).  
8. Chapter VIII 
This chapter provides the guidelines for suppliers to challenge any decision of the 
procuring agency. This chapter provides for all possible methods for challenge and 
appeals (UNCITRAL Secretariat, 2014).  
The chapter comprises articles 64–69. Article 64 provides the right to suppliers 
and contractors to file an appeal or to challenge any proceedings during the procurement 
process. Article 65 specifies the effects a challenge can have on the procurement process 
and provides the procedural safeguard in case of any appeal that it may consider to be not 
in the public interest (UNCITRAL Secretariat, 2014).  
Article 66 explains the methodology for filing an appeal or a challenge before the 
procuring entity, whereas article 67 specifies the process in case the matter is referred to 
an independent body. Article 68 provides the rights to the stakeholders (i.e., the procuring 
entity), as well as the suppliers, to be part of the proceedings and contest their case 
(UNCITRAL Secretariat, 2014).  
L. ANALYSIS  
The model law is comprehensive and requires an exhaustive study to analyze its 
various aspects; the paucity of space has restricted the analysis to some important facets 
that are more pertinent to thesis. 
1. Objectives  
The six objectives, as adopted by the UNCITRAL (UNCITRAL Secretariat, 
2014), explicitly highlights the fundamental concepts that the commission focuses on for 
better harmonization and streamlining international trade in a globalized and shrinking 
world. All the objectives support an overall objective.  
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The idea of economy and efficiency (UNCITRAL Secretariat, 2013) lays down 
the principal foundation for developing the model law. As described in article 12 of 
model law (UNCITRAL Secretariat, 2014), efficiency is translated into the administrative 
costs of the procurement and the value of the commodity, item, or framework agreement 
that is being procured. The model law, however, provides the flexibility for the enacting 
states to define the term efficiency. 
2. Flexibility 
The UNCITRAL model law provides a greater degree of flexibility to the 
enacting states in following the law. The flexibility can, however, distracts from the 
primary reason of developing the commission: to harmonize the international trade. As 
indicated by Arrowsmith (2004), it is up to the enacting state how much weight it 
attaches to the objectives of the model law because it is not a binding agreement on the 
member state.  
If integrity and transparency were more desirable, then the idea would be to limit 
the discretion of the procurement officials by enacting the law. The same outcome will 
also prevail when the skills of the procurement officials require augmentation. The 
flexibility is generally used where the cost of undertaking procurement requires 
substantial reduction, and discretion is desirable to speed up the process of procurement. 
The socioeconomic policies of the enacting state can also play a role where the policy 
may require supporting the domestic player rather than the international player. 
3. Procurement Planning  
Article 6 of the model law emphasizes the prior planning of the procurement 
activity. This step would promote participation by suppliers and enhance transparency in 
the procurement system (UNCITRAL Secretariat, 2013). However, the provision 
provides the flexibility to the procuring agency for any subsequent change in the plan that 
may occur due to any circumstances. 
The idea of prior information is based on two fundamentals cornerstones: open 
competition and economy of resources. It also ensures that procurement entities do not 
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indulge themselves in “ad hoc” or “emergency” procurements that incur huge additional 
costs. The gray area that needs to be focused on is that there is a likelihood of collusion 
(UNCITRAL Secretariat, 2013) in case of prior publicity of the procurement action.  
It is not always advisable to publish the procurement plans, and a delicate balance 
needs to be maintained to achieve the overall objectives of economy, efficiency, and open 
competition. 
4. Maximum Competition 
The model law promotes competition among suppliers so that the value of money 
spent is maximized (UNCITRAL Secretariat, 2013). The suppliers will have an 
opportunity to participate objectively to benefit from open and fair competition, and the 
procurement entities will have better option to choose among a host of suppliers best 
suited to their requirement. Articles 28, 31, 34, and 49 (UNCITRAL Secretariat 2014, pp. 
29, 32, 33, 48) deal with various aspects of the competition to provide equal grounds to 
the suppliers to achieve the optimum outcome for the process of procurement. However, 
in case of more complex contracts, the procurement entities can limit the participation, as 
mentioned in Chapters IV and V (UNCITRAL Secretariat, 2014) of the suppliers to 
promote effective competition and concrete outcomes.  
5. Security of Information 
Defense procurement is a key and a critical component of public procurement in 
most of the countries around the globe. On average, approximately 2% of the total GDP 
(World Bank, 2014) is spent on the military, of which procurement is one of the major 
components.  
The sensitivity of the defense procurement is understandable and has been 
acknowledged in the UNCITRAL model law. Defense procurement may require the 
enacting states to strike a balance between the protection of information and transparency 
obligations (UNCITRAL Secretariat, 2013). Article 2 of the model law (UNCITRAL 
Secretariat, 2014) provides a flexible definition of the classified information that may be 
encountered in procurement related to national defense and security.  
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Article 7 and Article 25 (UNCITRAL Secretariat, 2014) impose some limitations 
with a view to protecting the classified information. Some special provisions are enacted 
to facilitate the states to adopt such measures to address the sensitivity of the issue. In 
addition, the model law does provide the enacting state with the option to expand 
definition of classified information according to its own priority and convenience.  
6. Transparency 
The transparency in the public procurement is one of the key issues that have 
tremendous implications on the international trade. The provisions of the model law 
converge the issues on the transparency of the procurement system so that international 
trade can be promoted. 
The idea of transparency according to the model law revolves around five 
elements:  
• Public disclosure of the applicable rules in procurement process 
• Publication of procurement opportunities 
• Prior planning of the procurement activity  
• Conduct of procurement activities as per the rules and regulations 
• Monitoring mechanism of procurement system (UNCITRAL Secretariat, 
2013, p. 34). 
Transparency measures are discussed throughout the model law from different 
perspectives to ensure that the system provides equal opportunities to all the stakeholders 
that are part of the system. The model law has attempted to strike a balance between the 
two major stakeholders: procurement entities and suppliers. A number of articles 
included in the model law—namely, articles 5, 7, 8–11, 13, 14, 22, 23, 25, 33–35, 39, 42, 
and 47–49—provide the statutory framework in an attempt to make the procurement 
system as transparent as possible (UNCITRAL Secretariat, 2014). 
The inherent flexibility in adoption provides the enacting state with the leverage 
to inject its own provision to promote transparency in the procurement system. These 
inclusions may rest on the circumstances that the state finds itself in; and the 
socioeconomic policies of the state nudges the state to adopt the model law according to 
its convenience.  
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The transparency capstone in the model law aims to provide a level playing field 
for all the stakeholders so that discretion at any stage is minimized and transparency is 
promoted. It provides inbuilt checks and balances so that not one stakeholder enjoys 
discretionary powers to skew the system’s outcome in its favor. 
The concept translates into recommendations of a monitoring system, as 
described in Chapter VIII (UNCITRAL Secretariat, 2014), to ensure that the discretion is 
not misused.  
The model law recommends administrative and institutional support for the 
implementation of a legal framework for the procurement process. The legal framework 
requires detailed instruction and methodologies to streamline the process of procurement. 
Institutional support is desirable in many avenues that can harmonize procurement 
system. These include the following: 
• Ensuring effective implementation of the existing rules and regulations  
• Standardization of the procurement system 
• Monitoring mechanisms to implement government policies 
• Capacity building of the procurement officials to maximize the economy 
and efficiency (UNCITRAL Secretariat, 2013, p. 16) 
7. Socioeconomic Policies 
The socioeconomic aspect of the procurement system is one of the major 
considerations by the states. It can have a great impact on the overall direction of the 
government to promote economic activity and the social wellbeing of its citizens. Article 
2 (UNCITRAL Secretariat, 2014) provides the definition of the socioeconomic policies 
that can be expanded by the enacting state, specific to its requirements. 
There are some limitations to implementation of socioeconomic policy within the 
procurement system. The model law puts the caveat of “no overlapping” with the 
international agreements as the baseline for the implementation of such policies.  
The effect of such a policy may impact the procurement system as a whole. The 
equal opportunity to the stakeholder, economy, and efficiency are not achieved as 
conceived by the model law. Because a major portion of the annual fund is funneled 
through the public procurement system, UNCITRAL model law (UNCITRAL 
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Secretariat, 2014) provides the flexibility to the states that may require only domestic 
contractors.  
Article 8 does provide leverage to the state to define the conditions that limit the 
participation on the basis of environmental and ethical standards (UNCITRAL 
Secretariat, 2013). However, the transparency requirements suggest that these actions be 
recorded and that procuring entities objectively justify these actions. 
M. CONCLUSION  
In this chapter, the historical evolution of UNCITRAL model law was discussed. 
A brief overview of the objectives, composition, and working methodology of 
UNCITRAL was covered. A brief summary of UNCITRAL model law provided an 
overview of various aspects of the law. 
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IV. OVERVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES PROCUREMENT 
In Pakistan, negotiated procurement is considered a non-competitive form of 
contracting, whereas in the United States it is considered competitive. Negotiations in the 
United States have roots in technological development that was necessitated during 
World Wars I and II. The work in this chapter will lead the readers to understand the 
acquisition system, its structure, and the participants involved in the process. The 
reflection on Yoder’s (2006) Three Integrative Pillars of Success (TIPS) model will help 
the readers understand the importance of personnel, platforms, and protocols involved in 
the acquisition process. The analysis of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) will 
enable readers to assess strengths of the FAR related to the empowerment of the 
contracting officer, powers entrusted to them, and public expectations. Reflections on 
different forms of contracting and the Truth in Negotiations Act (TINA) will give readers 
a view of the foundations of the negotiations process placed on a 360-degree 
accountability loop that encompasses government vendors as well. The TINA provides 
access to government auditors and binds vendors to submitting certified cost and price 
data that is complete, correct, and current.  
A. TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT 
The pace of technological development is so fast that it has taken only 100 years 
from the first manned aircraft to the first unmanned aircraft. Since the end of World War 
II (WWII), technological development has progressed at an unprecedented pace to meet 
the needs of warfighters at different land, air, and sea theaters (Humily, Taylor, & Roller, 
1999). To catch up with technological advancements, DOD facilities innovated dramatic 
modern-day advancements, like the World Wide Web (www), global positioning systems 
(GPS), and drones; however, historically, the U.S. government relies considerably on the 
private sector for the development of complex weapon systems. Over time, not only have 
weapons become sophisticated, precise, expensive, and complex, but also the government 
rules and regulations. The development of these weapons requires billions of dollars, and 
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the U.S. government has been spending that amount over the years. Figure 3 shows 
Defense budget breakdowns in the 2015 President’s Budget Request:  
 
 Defense Budget Breakdowns in the 2015 President’s Budget Request (from Figure 3. 
Office of the Secretary Defense [OSD], 2014, p. 2) 
When the quantum of funding is huge dollar appropriations, accounting and 
auditing (Straight, n.d.) require handling by professionals to avoid misappropriation and 
waste. A unique acquisition process is available in the DOD to manage procurement 
dollars. Before proceeding to procurement contracting, however, it is necessary to give a 
broad overview of the acquisition process, its participants, and structure. 
B. ACQUISITION AS DEFINED AND UNDERSTOOD IN THE UNITED 
STATES 
As defined in FAR 2.101, acquisition is defined as 
the acquiring by contract with appropriated funds of supplies or services 
(including construction) by and for the use of the federal government 
through purchase or lease, whether the supplies or services are already in 
existence or must be created, developed, demonstrated and evaluated. 
Acquisition begins at the point when agency needs are established and 
includes the description of requirements to satisfy agency needs, 
solicitation and selection of sources, award of contracts, contract 
financing, contract performance, contract administration, and those 
technical and management functions directly related to the process of 
fulfilling agency needs by contract. (Federal Acquisition Regulation 
[FAR] 2.101, 2015) 
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The DOD acquisition of major weapon systems emanates from a perception of 
military threat. When a perceived threat is assessed, utilizing in-house, available 
resources is always considered an economical and wise solution. Likewise, the DOD 
contemplates future threats and makes all endeavors to meet the threat from available 
resources. This process saves billions of taxpayers’ dollars allocated not only for 
acquisition of new weapon systems, but also expended throughout the life cycle of the 
acquired systems. The DOD requests the development of new weapon systems only when 
no existing weapon system can be upgraded or modified to meet the future threat 
assessment. In their research, Humily et al. (1999) mentioned that when military services 
perceive shortfalls in existing strengths, its first preference is to materialize deficiencies 
through soft modifications (i.e., change in doctrine, training, or tactics). Hard-material 
changes or new acquisitions are resorted to only if soft non-material upgrades do not 
bridge the gap between supply and demand (Humily et al., 1999).  
C. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION SCHEDULE 
The FAR part 8 defines another methodology for obtaining supplies and services 
by eligible federal, state, and local government agencies other than procurement through 
FAR part 13, 14, and 15. The FAR subpart 8.002 prescribes following a chain of 
command for acquisition of supplies and services:  
8.002 Priorities for Use of Mandatory Government Sources. 
(a) Except as required by 8.003, or as otherwise provided by law, agencies 
shall satisfy requirements for supplies and services from or through the 
sources and publications listed below in descending order of priority:  
(1) Supplies. 
(i) Inventories of the requiring agency. 
(ii) Excess from other agencies (see subpart 8.1). 
(iii) Federal Prison Industries, Inc. (see subpart 8.6). 
(iv) Supplies which are on the Procurement List maintained by the 
Committee for purchase from people who are blind or severely disabled 
(see subpart 8.7). 
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(v) Wholesale supply sources, such as stock programs of the General 
Services Administration (GSA) (see 41CFR 101-26.3), the Defense 
Logistics Agency (see 41 CFR 101-26.6), the Department of Veterans 
Affairs (see 41 CFR 101-26.704), and military inventory control points. 
(2) Services. Services that are on the procurement list maintained by the 
committee for purchase from people who are blind or severely disabled 
(see subpart 8.7). 
(b) Sources other than those listed in paragraph (a) of this section may be 
used as prescribed in 41 CFR 101-26.301 and in an unusual and 
compelling urgency as prescribed in 6.302-2 and in 41 CFR 101-25.101-5. 
(c) The statutory obligation for Government agencies to satisfy their 
requirements for supplies or services available from the committee for 
purchase from people who are blind or severely disabled also applies 
when contractors purchase the supplies or services for Government use. 
The Federal Supply Schedule (FSS), also known as the GSA schedule program, is 
another form of government procurement where the GSA enters into long-term contracts 
with vendors for easy, fast, and economical purchases. The GSA enters into IDIQ 
contracts, blanket purchase agreements (BPAs), and contractors team arrangements 
(CTAs) by fulfilling all pre-requisites of government procurement. Therefore, eligible 
agencies of federal, state, and local governments can obtain volume quantities of supplies 
and services at pre-defined rates and for a pre-define time period without undergoing 
complex procurement processes repeatedly. The FAR subpart 8.4 governs the rules and 
regulations related to the establishment of contracts by ordering agencies and 
methodologies to be followed by requiring agencies. 
The eligible government buyers can order goods and services through the GSA e-
library or GSA advantage where all participating vendors have to publish their current 
price catalog. The GSA purchases offers following benefits to the customers: 
• Additional price discounts for ordering activities 
• Expanded opportunities for contractors 
• Elimination of redundant effort, with a single contracting vehicle fulfilling 
complex or ongoing needs 
• Reductions in administrative time and paperwork 
• Expanded business opportunities for socioeconomic groups 
• Help for ordering activities wishing to reach socioeconomic goals (GSA, 
2015) 
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D. ACQUISITION SUPPORT STRUCTURE IN THE DEPARTMENT OF 
DEFENSE 
Before 1947, the United States had only the Department of War for management 
of military affairs besides the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps. However, the deficiencies, 
such as command and control over resource allocations, identified in World War II 
(WWII), led to establishment of the DOD in 1947.  Presently, the DoD consists of two 
elements: the Combatant Commands, and the acquisition and logistics support elements. 
Appendix A shows the organizational command structure of the DOD. 
For acquisition of new capabilities and weapon systems, an effective 
organizational structure is available at the DOD, as well as individual service 
components. According to Fox (2011), the acquisition structure at the DOD level has 
three interrelated and interdependent participants (p. 5). These are Joint Capabilities 
Integration and Development (JCIDS), Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and 
Execution System (PPBES) and Acquisition or Procurement System. Jointly, these three 
are called Big “A” of the acquisition process. Diagrammatically, their interdependence 
and integration can be represented, as shown in Figure 4. 
 




Taking a deep dive into the JCIDS and PPBES is beyond the scope of this work; 
however, future researchers may like to compare the United States’ PPBES with 
Pakistan’s budgeting system. It is, however, deemed appropriate to give a brief overview 
of the JCIDS and PPBES for the reader not familiar with these systems. The knowledge-
hungry reader may dig deep into each of them separately.  
1. Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System 
Prescription of military requirements is the cornerstone of the procurement 
desired capability/weapon system. Sound definition of military requirements not only 
conserve individual efforts but also ensure timely completion of a program. In the United 
States, the organization for issuance of policy directives on requirements generation is the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Component services prepare the acquisition requirements and 
forward them to the JCIDS. The purpose of the JCIDS is to assist the Joint Requirements 
Oversight Council (JROC) and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) in 
identification, assessment, validation, and prioritization of joint military capabilities of all 
four component services (Spainhower, 2015). The JCIDS receives requirements from 
each service for the acquisition of new capabilities, assessing requirements, and 
processing them after evaluation through the sieve of joint capabilities’ gaps and 
shortfalls. The JCIDS subsequently gives an affirmative or negative decision to 
individual services to pursue the case further with PPBES for funding appropriation and 
development of the capability. 
2. Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System 
PPBES is a process of allocation and appropriation of budgetary requirements. 
Before 1962, each military service component programmed, planned, and budgeted a 
year at a time. In 1962, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and Charles J. Fitch, 
Office of Secretary Defense Comptroller, envisioned the government’s way of working 
on corporate lines (Humily et al., 1999). They centralized the military services budget 
and provided a process based on a five-year strategic planning. PPBES connects future 
threats with resource allocation and military capacity building to maintain national 
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security and peace around the globe. Appendix B shows the DOD PPBES cycle, 
including its different stages:  
a. Planning 
Translated from the president’s national security strategy, the OSD and JCS 
collaborate and develop Defense Planning and Program Guidance (DPPG) and National 
Military Strategy and (NMS), respectively, in coordination with component services. The 
planning phase blends national threats into resource-informed policy guidelines to the 
military services for evolution of respective capabilities in the due course of the 
budgetary cycle. DPPG and NMS link the planning phase with programming and 
subsequently serve component services in continuing national policy guidelines. The 
planning phase focuses on requirements first, affordability second.  
b. Programming 
The outcome of the programming phase is a program objective memorandum 
(POM). Military services components drive their POMs from DPPG. In POM, the 
military services state their program wise, hard, and soft requirements, along with 
justifications. These requirements are prepared based on available financial resources. 
Programming translates strategic planning priorities in the order of affordability. 
c. Budgeting 
Programs from POM are set for budget estimation. During the budgeting phase, 
each service prepares and submits specific yearly financial requirements in the form of a 
budget estimate submission (BES) to OSD. OSD scrutinizes and resolves issues in BES 
and submits the DOD budget to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The 
OMB subsequently includes the DOD budget in the president’s budget, which is 
presented to Congress in February of each year.  
d. Execution 
All services components obligate and outlay appropriated resources in the 
execution phase. The execution review helps senior leaders measure effectiveness of the 
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appropriated resources. It also helps in measuring actual productivity with a planned 
course of action. The execution phase runs parallel with planning and programming 
phases. 
3. Acquisition or Procurement System 
The U.S. government has the maximum procurement in the world. Humily et al. 
(1999, pp. 5–43) mentions USD $128 billion U.S. procurement spending in 1998. Lately, 
the figure has slightly reduced; however, the quantum is still around one tenth of a trillion 
dollars. Figure 5 gives a historical and President’s Budget 2015 (PB15) (fiscal year (FY) 
1962–2019) overview of Defense budget accounts.  
 
 Historical View of DOD Budget Accounts (from OSD, 2014, p. 2) Figure 5. 
E. YODER’S THREE INTEGRATIVE PILLARS OF SUCCESS MODEL—
PERSONNEL, PLATFORMS, AND PROTOCOLS 
Yoder, Long, and Nix (2013), in their research “Phase Zero Contracting 
Operations,” identified personnel, platforms, and protocols as three integrated pillars of 
success (TIPS) in an organization. According to the Yoder et al. (2013), the three pillars 
work in harmony with each other. Without any one of them remaining, two pillars cannot 
work efficiently. They also consider budget allocation and appropriation as foundations 
for these pillars working seamlessly. Likewise, Yoder et al. (2013) are of the view that 
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these three pillars need to work in harmony for efficient working of the acquisition 
process of an organization or a country. To carry out negotiations in the contract process, 
these pillars are to be put in place effectively for transparent, informed, and valuable 
decision-making. The subsequent work in this section analyzes each of these pillars in 
detail to help readers understand the importance of each of the pillars in the procurement 
process. 
1. Personnel 
According to Yoder et al. (2012), personnel is the critical link between rank, 
position, credentials, and capability. A most efficient organization (MEO) has to have the 
right combination of the right people with the right skill set and at the right place with 
balanced workload and performance measurement. Yoder et al. (2012) further divided 
this pillar into three tiers in their Three Tier Model. According to three tier model, 
personnel work in different capacities of workers, mid-level managers, and strategists. 
The authors are of the view that all of the personnel need to be equipped with right set of 
skills and powers for an organization to work efficiently (Yoder et al., 2012). 
The strength of the current U.S. military has not been gained overnight. It has 
evolved over a period of decades. In the late 1980s, the DOD faced public criticism for 
wasting taxpayers’ dollars, primarily due to the inefficient buying practices of DOD 
professionals. Humily et al. (1999) wrote that the expensive procurements created an 
impression in the minds of the American public that the system was out of control 
(Humily et al., 1999). To build the capacity of contracting personnel, not only the DOD 
contributes, but also the U.S. government and legislature oversee and take a keen interest 
in the measures necessary for improvement of acquisition workforce. In 1986, realizing 
the need of the hour, President Ronald Reagan, under Executive Order 12526, established 
a Blue Ribbon Commission. Mr. David Packard was the chairman of the commission. At 
that time, the DOD was plagued with inefficient management of taxpayers’ dollars. The 
purpose for establishment of the commission, as stated in the Packard commission final 
report, was as follows:  
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The President established the Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense 
Management in part because public confidence in the effectiveness of the 
defense acquisition system has been shaken by a spate of ‘horror stories’ – 
overpriced spare parts, test deficiencies and cost and schedule overruns. 
Unwelcome at any time, such stories are particularly unsettling when the 
Administration and Congress are seeking ways to deal with record budget 
deficits. A major task of this Commission has been to evaluate the defense 
acquisition, to determine how it might be improved, and to recommend 
changes that can lead to the acquisition of military equipment with equal 
or greater performance but at lower cost and with less delay.  For this 
purpose, the commission formed an Acquisition Task Force. (Packard 
1986, 41) 
In its report, besides other findings, the commission found room for improvement 
in civilian and military acquisition workforce of the DOD. The commission 
recommended the establishment of an undersecretary of acquisition under the OSD, with 
a mandate to act as a senior executive of acquisition workforce and make independent 
decisions and policy-making in light of the president’s strategic guidelines. The post of 
undersecretary of acquisition was subsequently created in 1986, as a result of the 
Goldwater-Nickels Bill, which has now evolved into the undersecretary of acquisition, 
technology, and logistics (AT&L). The organization chart of office of undersecretary of 
AT&L is placed in Appendix C. In this regard, the board recommended the following:  
For these reasons, it is fundamental that we establish unambiguous 
authority for overall acquisition policy, clear accountability for acquisition 
execution, plain lines of command for those with program management 
responsibilities. It is also imperative that we streamline acquisition 
procedures. This can be facilitated by five related actions: 
1. We strongly recommend creation by statute of the new position of 
Under Secretary of Defense (USD Acquisition) and authorization of an 
additional Level II appointment in the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense (OSD). (Packard, 1986, 53) 
a. Training of Personnel 
In 1985, perceiving the technological pace in the United States, the DOD 
convened a review of the entire education and training systems under the DOD. The 
findings of the investigation, coincidently, were more or less the same as those of the 
Packard Commission. Both studies found the acquisition workforce undertrained, 
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underpaid, and inexperienced. In 1990, based on both the investigations, Congress 
enacted the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA). The DAWIA 
was subsequently amended and incorporated into U.S.C. Title 10 Chapter 87. The 
DAWIA stipulates that all DOD agency heads take measures for training and capacity 
building of respective civilian and military acquisition workforces. According to Section 
1701A, Parts (b) (4) and (5), the USD (AT&L) is to develop career paths and sustained 
ways for capacity building through training. 
The DAWIA was further augmented by DOD Instruction 5000.66, demonstrating 
the DOD’s resolution to train and develop a professional, agile, and motivated workforce 
that should be able to make credible decisions. The policy excerpt from DOD Instruction 
5000.66(4) is given below:  
Policy: It is DoD policy that the primary objective of the AT&L 
Workforce Education, Training and Career Development Program is to 
create a professional, agile and motivated workforce that consistently 
makes smart business decisions, acts in an ethical manner, and delivers 
timely and affordable capabilities to the warfighter. The AT&L Workforce 
Education, Training and Career Development Program improves the 
capabilities and management of the AT&L Workforce by: developing a 
highly qualified, diverse workforce capable of performing current and 
future DoD acquisition, technology and logistics functions; preparing 
future key leaders; providing career guidance and opportunities for 
broadening experiences and progression; managing Key Leadership 
Positions (KLPs) to enhance program stability and accountability; and 
ensuring effective use of training and education resources. (DOD 
Instruction 5000.66 (4)) 
Para 5.1.2 of DoD Instruction 5000.66 binds the USD (AT&L) to seeking funding 
for education, training, and career development of the AT&L workforce. According to 
Para. 5.1.6 of said instructions, the USD (AT&L) is also to make policies for the AT&L 
workforce education, training, and development.  
The training of the workforce becomes easier because funds for each service is 
part of the legal framework. Under FAR 1.102-4(c), the government has shown its 
commitment to train, develop, and provide other resources necessary for professional 
development and knowledge improvement of the AT&L workforce.  The legislation 
provides consistency and longevity to policies derived for training purposes. No single 
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individual services chief can alter or reduce the scope of capacity building at his or her 
whims in contravention to legislated demands.  
b. Capacity Building of Personnel 
The legal framework serves as a foundation for the creation and capacity 
development of the acquisition/contracting workforce. Consequently, the DOD at central 
and each service at individual level take measures for development of their acquisition 
workforce. In October 1991, establishment of the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) 
was a part of such efforts. The DAU offers Levels I, II, and III certification in acquisition. 
The detail of the courses offered by the DAU is available on its website (see DAU, n.d.). 
The contracting workforce has to undergo these certification courses, at different stages 
of their professional career, to qualify to work in various capacities. Similarly, individual 
services institutes like the Naval Postgraduate School offer a variety of short as well as 
graduate courses.  
According to the Defense Acquisition Structures and Capabilities Review report 
(2007), prepared pursuant to section 814 of National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 
FY06, the educational, training, and experience status of the acquisition workforce has 
improved since Packard’s recommendations. According to the report, the 74% of civilian 
AT&L workforce has bachelors or advanced degrees, which is higher than its DOD 
civilian white-collar colleagues. The report also mentioned that 66% of the AT&L 
civilian workforce is DAWIA certified, and 50% had a higher certification level than 
required by work position. The certification percentage increases to 76% for critical 
acquisition positions. 
2. Platforms 
Platforms is the second pillar of the Yoder TIPS model. According to Yoder 
(2006), the second pillar is the combination of hardware and software that helps in 
analysis, decision-making, production, management, and communication. These tools 
examine qualitative and quantitative mixture and appropriateness for the mission of an 
organization. The authors of this work build on the platforms of Yoder and take it one 
step forward. The authors are of the view that platforms also encompass organizations 
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and institutions that help build the capacity of the personnel—the first pillar of the TIPS 
model. These institutions make the first pillar efficient and effective. 
According to Dr. Daniel Goure (2013), the DOD acquisition and sustainment 
focus swings like a pendulum between effectiveness on one side and efficiency on the 
other. Effectiveness is required in war time when the right item is required at the right 
place and at the right time. On the other hand, efficiency is the best value of money 
usually attempted to be achieved at lowest cost. The effectiveness and efficiency reside at 
two opposite ends of the pendulum. Since 9/11, the U.S. military has been fighting a war 
against terror. The acquisition organization has to support its forces both at home and in 
combat zones abroad. The peace and wartime requirements is forwarded by the 
contiguous U.S. (CONUS) and outside the contiguous U.S. (OCONUS) by finding a 
balance between effectiveness and efficiency for sustainment of peace in the long run.  
To sustain both CONUS and OCONUS forces, the DOD and component services 
have established different acquisition organizations to uphold the needs of the U.S. 
military operations. These organizations perform different pre- and post-acquisition roles 
like supplies, contracts management, and audit. Subsequent paragraphs brief readers 
about DOD acquisition organizations. 
a. Defense Logistics Agency 
The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) is the central combat logistics support 
agency that provides support to all the U.S. component services and armed forces of 
allied nations. The DLA was established in 1961 as the Defense Supply Agency. It has 
evolved over time from a supply to logistics to a management agency of eight supply 
chains: energy, subsistence, clothing and textiles, medical, construction and equipment, 
aviation, land, and maritime. According to the DLA’s fact sheet, it processes more than 
10,000 contract lines per day, meets 100% requirements of consumable items and 80% 
spare support of non-consumables of common weapon systems. In 2014, the DLA 
claimed to generate USD $38 billion in sales and revenue, thereby giving it bargaining 
power to leverage efficiency in its procurement (DLA, 2015).  
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b. Defense Contract Management Agency 
The roots of the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) reside in the 
DLA. In 1990, Defense Contract Management Command was established in the DLA for 
contract management and administration purposes. Due to the magnitude and complex 
nature of the work, it evolved into a single independent federal agency in March 2000. 
The DCMA manages around 300,000 active contracts with a face value of USD $1.773 
billion (DAU, 2006). The DCMA guides government agencies throughout the contracting 
process. Before award of a contract, the DCMA helps in effective negotiating, selecting 
contractors, and writing contracts. After the award of the contract, the DCMA monitors 
contract performance and delivery schedules for timely completion of the projects and 
materialization of the contract (DCMA, 2014), as per prescribed terms and conditions of 
the formal contract. 
c. Defense Contract Audit Agency 
The Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) provides audit and financial 
advisory services to the DOD and other federal entities responsible for acquisition and 
contract administration (DCAA, n.d.). The DCAA provides these services for 
negotiations, administration, and settlement of contracts and subcontracts (Humily et al., 
1999). 
3. Protocols 
The third pillar of the Yoder TIPS model is protocols. Yoder (2006) view the 
third pillar as a set of rules, framework, policies, and business model required for 
achieving the end state. The protocols describe what needs to be achieved and how to 
achieve it. The best approach to achieve the end objective is to define the protocols and 
map every step with an end objective. The mapping keeps the remaining two pillars 
aligned with organizational objectives.  
The U.S. Small Business Administration (n.d.) website cites U.S. procurement 
regulations as a substantial and complex set of rules governing the federal acquisition 
process. In numerous ways, students and the acquisition workforce have to be mindful of 
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fulfilling requirements prescribed under the FAR, DFARS, Title 10 U.S.C., and different 
policy directives issued by respective military component services. The fact was also 
acknowledged by Senator David Packard to President Ronald Reagan in his final report 
of Blue Ribbon Commission: 
Federal law governing procurement has become overwhelmingly complex. 
Each new Statute adopted by Congress has spawned more administrative 
regulation. As law and regulation have proliferated, defense acquisition 
has become ever more bureaucratic and encumbered by unproductive 
layers of management and overstaffing. (Packard, 1986, p. xxii). 
A question arises: why are the policies and regulations so complex? A private 
firm procures the same item in much less time, thereby acting more efficiently; whereas, 
it takes longer in the public sector to purchase the same item. According to Sandy Keeney 
(2007), a private firm looks after its own interests; whereas a government has to look 
after public interest (p. 18). Moreover, when the quantum of procurement in government 
is huge, history has witnessed that the kickbacks and personal gain have raised the need 
to enact conflict-of-interest regulations. Therefore, to protect public interest, government 
has to enact rules and regulations to avoid misappropriation of public money. In Pakistan, 
PPRA Rules 2004 are the federal regulations for procurement of goods and services for 
the federal government. The counterpart of the PPRA rules in the United States is the 
FAR. Readers need to understand that there are other regulations, like the DFARS, Army 
regulations that guide purchases. The following section enlightens readers about strengths 
of the FAR. 
F. FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATIONS 
Although the FAR serves as the current acquisition regulations for U.S. federal 
agencies, its roots are traceable to the Public Affairs Act of 1795, the Armed Services 
Procurement Act of 1947, and the Federal Procurement Regulations of 1949. Finally, on 
April 1, 1984, all of them were brought under a uniform regulation through the 
Competition in Contracting Act. This act is updated and maintained by three agencies: 
the GSA, the DOD, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). 
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Organizationally, the FAR comprises 53 parts. Each part is divided into a subpart, 
section, and subsection, and focuses on different subjects. To make use of the FAR easier 
and more understandable, each part, subpart, section, and subsection is numbered as 
shown in Table 2. 








G. STRENGTHS OF THE FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATIONS 
1. Empowerment and Responsibility 
The FAR vests contracting authority in the agency head; however, its conventions 
also include delegation of authority. It empowers contracting officers to enter into 
contracts on behalf of the U.S. government. With empowerment the FAR, as referred to 
earlier, also binds contracting officers to fulfil requirements of law, executive orders, 
regulations, and procedures, besides user requirements, lest their reputation and career be 
harmed. According to FAR 1.601(a): 
Unless specifically prohibited by another provision of law, authority and 
responsibility to contract for authorized supplies and services are vested in 
the agency head. The agency head may establish contracting activities and 
delegate broad authority to manage the agency’s contracting functions to 
heads of such contracting activities. Contracts may be entered into and 
signed on behalf of the Government only by contracting officers. In some 
agencies, a relatively small number of high level officials are designated 
contracting officers solely by virtue of their positions. 
2. Supplier: A Teammate 
In contemporary business practices, a supplier is considered a partner instead of a 
vendor. According to a white paper of Sales Performance International, there are five 
levels of customer supplier relationship. At levels 4 and 5, the supplier acts as strategic 
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contributor and trusted partner, respectively (Sales Performance International, n.d., p. 2).  
The U.S. government has given its suppliers a status of trusted partner and strategic 
contributor towards national objectives by incorporating contractors in the definition of 
acquisition team under FAR 1.102(c):  
The Acquisition Team consists of all participants in Government 
acquisition including not only representatives of the technical, supply, and 
procurement communities but also the customers they serve, and the 
contractors who provide the products and services. 
3. Honesty 
The FAR 1.102 provides guiding principles for the federal acquisition system. It 
envisions the federal acquisition workforce as upright, honest, well trained, and 
customer-oriented. Customer orientation may disorientate an uprightness of a contracting 
officer due to any conflict of interest. Keeping the conflict of interest in view, Dr. 
Schooner commented in his 2002 research that customer satisfaction may generate 
inefficiency in the procurement process, especially when contracting personnel buy for 
whom they serve, and when the procurement personnel endeavor to please their 
customers (p. 11). Subpart 3.1 augments the FAR 1.102 by forbidding any government 
official from accepting any tangible or intangible favors, from anyone who has direct or 
indirect gains with performance or non-performance of the official.  
4. 360o Checks and Balances 
The FAR provides 360-degree checks and balances on the acquisition team, 
including contracting officer, contractor, and contractor’s employees. The contracting 
officers have to oversee the behavior of government contractors during the tenure of the 
business with the government. A contracting officer can process a case for debarment, 
suspension, and ineligibility under FAR Part 9 for any suspected violations of ethical 
business practices given in FAR Part 3. Any aggrieved supplier can raise protest under 
FAR Part 33, if aggrieved by actions of a contracting officer. The regulations also 
provide protection to whistleblowers under FAR 52.203-15 and under section 1553 of 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 to contractor’s employees. The FAR 
52.203-17 provides whistle blowing rights to contractor employees, binding a contractor 
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to inform employees about their rights. The cycle completes with a check on the 
employee’s behavior under FAR 52.203-16(b)(6) that binds a contractor to report any 
personal conflict of interest on the part of contractor employee to a contracting officer. 
This checks and balances cycle helps keep every individual in an acquisition team on the 
track and minimize, if not eliminate, chances of malpractice and kickbacks.  
5. Efficiency through Reduction of Overheads 
Private organizations always strive to achieve efficiency in their work process 
through reduction, if not elimination, of overheads. Lately, McDonald’s has outsourced 
handling of its drive-through orders. With outsourcing, McDonalds aims to reduce order-
taking time, increase accuracy, and maximize profits by saving in-house employment 
costs at each McDonald’s outlet (Anish, 2008). Although it is in the testing phase, 
McDonald’s endeavors to achieve an efficient work process by cutting overhead costs. 
FAR 1.102-2 (b), in like manner, envisages an acquisition team that brings best valued 
products and services efficiently and in a timely manner to the customer by reducing 
overhead in the acquisition process. In May 2010, Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates 
announced department-wide measures to assess DOD staff, organization, and operations 
with an aim to reduce overhead costs and achieve efficient force structure (Government 
Accountability Office [GAO], 2014). Pursuant to the directive of the OSD, military 
departments and Special Operations Command (SOCOM) instituted measures to save 
USD $100 billion from 2012 to 2016 through short- and long-term measures. As part of 
the overhead reduction measures, the DOD cancelled around 20 programs that would 
have cost more than USD $0.3 trillion if pursued (DOD, 2010). As a consequence of the 
secretary of defense’s directives, the DOD conceptualized and implemented a Better 
Buying Power (BBP) program as one of its other initiatives. The program aimed to 
directly or indirectly help the acquisition community get more by spending less for 
warfighters. The BBP helped the U.S. Army save taxpayers a considerable amount of 
money in FY12 by merging contracts of 292 double V-Hulls and 100 nuclear bio-
chemical reconnaissance vehicles. Similarly, the U.S. Air Force saved around $32 million 
in should-cost analysis of the F-22 system. In like manner, BBP helped the U.S. Navy 
realize $298 million in savings in FY11 and FY12 by resorting to competitive allocation 
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strategy for construction of DDG51 ships at Bath Iron Works (BIW) and Huntington 
Ingalls Incorporated (HII). 
6. Transparency 
According to Merriam-Webster (2015), transparency is something honest and 
open: not secretive. Because government procurement involves public money, every 
procurement action has to be open to the public and transparent for all stakeholders.  This 
means that any stakeholder has free access to information. The U.S. procurement rules 
and regulations employ the procurement system to work in an open manner. The U.S. 
government maintains transparency in public procurement through 
• publication of requirements 
• clear definitions about how bids will be evaluated 
• notification and public information of the winner and loser 
• the public information of contract award amount 
• protest opportunities 
• oversight mechanism 
• audit by inspector generals and the GAO 
• the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)  
H. CONTRACT METHODS 
Procurement is a complex process that varies from organization to organization 
based on industry experience, and from government to government based on public 
policies. Often, the buyer remains in a dilemma between competitive and negotiated 
procurement. Bajari. McMillan, and Taelis (2009) are of the view that procurement 
methodology depends on the structured nature of the item under procurement. The 
competitive process may not be a suitable procurement option when projects are 
complex, require contractual designs, involve construction, require deliberations, require 
ex-post adaptations, and when few bidders are available in the market. The authors, 
however, opine that competition is suitable for manufactured goods, like computers, 
washing machines, and so forth.  
The FAR also contains provisions for both competitive and non-competitive 
procurement. Competitive procurement was included in FAR Part 6 through the 
Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) of 1984. The purpose of the CICA was to 
 71 
• enhance the number of competitors, 
• increase savings by reduction of prices through better competition, 
• increase transparency, 
• maintain a true economy and accountability, and 
• produce best overall interest of the taxpayers. 
The policy definition of Part 6 binds the contracting officer to promoting full and 
open competition instead of maximum competition. According to the policy given in 
FAR Part 6.101 (2015), 
(a) 10 U.S.C 2304 and 41 U.S.C. 3301 require with certain exceptions, 
(given in subpart 6.2 and 6.3), that Contracting officer shall promote and 
provide for full and open competition in soliciting offers and awarding 
contracts. 
(b) Contracting officers shall provide for full and open competition 
through use of the competitive procedure(s) that are best suited to the 
circumstances of the contract action and consistent with the need to fulfil 
the Government’s requirements efficiently. 
The foundations to avoid maximum competition reside in the CICA. The CICA 
authors are of the view that competition has a point of diminishing returns, beyond which 
the government’s cost of competition surpasses savings (Manuel, 2011). Hence, to save 
public money, the contracting officer has to weigh the costs and benefits of competition. 
U.S. regulations give flexibility to the contracting officer to exercise judgement by 
satisfying himself or herself about the price through market research, especially in the 
procurement of commercially available items. 
Out of the following three, competitive contracts include the first two categories, 
whereas the last category falls under non-competitive contracts:  
• Full and open competition 
• Full and open competition after exclusion of sources 
• Other than full and open competition 
The incorporation of negotiated contracts under competitive forms of contracting 
has increased the proportion of the U.S. spending on competitive forms of contracting, 
whereas the funds spent on non-competitive forms of contracting proportionately 
amounts to only percentages. Figures 6 and 7 show the relative proportion of DOD 
competitive versus non-competitive contracts for 2015 and 2014, respectively. 
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 Type of Contracts vs. Funds Awarded (2015)  Figure 6. 
(from U.S.A. Spending, 2015) 
 
 Type of Contracts vs. Funds Awarded (2014) Figure 7. 
(from U.S.A. Spending, 2014) 
1. Full and Open Competition  
As given in FAR Part 6.101, full and open competition is a preferred mode of 
government contracting. The competitive procedures, given in FAR Part 6.102, that 
satisfy full and open competition requirements include sealed bids, negotiations, and 
other procedures. Full and open competition is achieved when requests for proposal 
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(RFPs) or invitation for bids (IFBs) include all responsible sources. A responsible source 
is a potential seller who 
(a) is financially solvent, 
(b) is capable to meet delivery schedule, 
(c) has satisfactory past performance track record, 
(d) has satisfactory past ethical business track record, 
(e) has organizational infrastructure to obtain promised goods/
services, and 
(f) is otherwise qualified and eligible for award of contract under laws 
and regulations (41 U.S.C. 403(7)). 
The details of full and open competition procedures are given in Appendix D. 
Generally, it is perceived that sealed bidding is the only way to achieve full and open 
competition. The U.S. regulations given in FAR Part 15 treat competitive negotiations 
and sealed bidding equally. The negotiations details are looked into later in this chapter.  
2. Full and Open Competition after Exclusion of Sources 
Full and open competition after exclusion of sources occurs when certain sources 
are excluded from consideration of a contract. This usually occurs on two occasions:  
(a) When agencies resort to dual sourcing in order to maintain 
alternative sources of supply. This practice is commonly observed in the 
DOD while distributing acquisition contracts among different vendors. 
The contractual distribution helps the DOD maintain competition and its 
buying power over suppliers. Congress supports dual sourcing is, for 
example, in the procurement of the propulsion system for F-22 Joint Strike 
Fighter aircraft (Gertler, 2011, p. 3). 
(b) When money is set aside for small businesses or local firms in case 
of natural calamities under the Small Business Act or Stafford Act, 
respectively. 
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3. Other Than Full and Open Competition 
A contract is considered non-competitive if it is entered into without full and open 
competition. The FAR Part 6 provides circumstances under which measures other than 
full and open competition are permitted; however, the regulations prohibit the head of the 
procurement agency to delegate the power to determine whether the viability of other 
than full and open competition is in the public interest. The details of circumstances, 
under which methods other than full and open competition can be opted to, are given in 
Appendix E.  
The regulations also bind agency heads to providing justification and seeking 
approval from Congress no less than 30 days prior to the award of the contract for non-
competitive award of contracts. The requirement of justification and approval is the 
biggest hurdle in exercising discretion to avoid full and open competition.  The 
justification process is not even exempted in unusual emergent cases. 10 U.S.C. section 
2304(f)(2) allows agency heads to provide justification after the award of the contract 
under said circumstances but does not exempt justification and approval.  
I. SIMPLIFIED ACQUISITION PROCEDURES 
Flexibility in government regulations helps contracting personnel adapt to new 
situations and provide combat support to warfighters quickly, efficiently, and effectively. 
The FAR provides flexibility to contracting officers on two fronts: 
(a) Commercial/non-commercial items purchase 
(b) Declared/non declared contingency environment 
In accordance with FAR 2.101, a declared contingency operation (10 U.S.C 
101(a)(13)) means a military operation that 
(1) is designated by the Secretary of Defense as an operation in which 
members of the armed forces are or may become involved in military 
actions, operations, or hostilities against an enemy of the U.S. or against 
an opposing military force; or 
(2) results in the call or order to, or retention on, active duty of members 
of the uniformed services under section 688, 12301(a), 12302, 12304, 
12304(a), 12305, or 12406 of title 10 of the U.S.C., Chapter 15 of title 10 
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of the U.S.C., or any other provision of law during a war or during a 
national emergency declared by the president or congress. 
In 1994, congress enacted the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA). The 
FASA replaced procedures of small purchases with simplified acquisition procedures 
(SAPs) and is now part of FAR part 13 as “Simplified Acquisition Procedures.” 
According to the policy given in FAR Part 13.003(a), the contracting officers are 
encouraged to use SAP to the maximum practicable extent: 
(a) Agencies shall use SAP to the maximum extent practicable for all 
purchases of supplies or services not exceeding the simplified acquisition 
threshold (including purchases at or below the micro-purchase threshold). 
This policy does not apply if an agency can meet its requirement using: 
(1) Required sources of supply under FAR part 8 (e.g., Federal Prison 
Industries, Committee for Purchase from people who are blind or severely 
disabled, and Federal supply schedule contracts); 
(2) Existing indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity contracts; or 
(3) Other established contracts. 
As referenced earlier, the objective of the FAR is to introduce efficiency in the 
procurement process. The SAP is also a step towards efficient procurement. The purpose 
of SAP is to procure required items efficiently, at lower cost, and without burdening 
buyer and supplier. As given in FAR Part 13.002, the purpose of the SAP is to 
(a) reduce administrative costs; 
(b) improve opportunities for small, small disadvantaged, women-owned, 
HUBZone, and services disabled veteran-owned, small business concerns 
to obtain a fair proportion of Government contracts; 
(c) promote efficiency and economy in contracting; and 
(d) avoid unnecessary burdens for agencies and contractors. 
SAP provides flexibility in purchase methods, payment procedures, and 
documentation. These flexibilities help reduce administrative costs of government and 
contractor. The FAR Subpart 13.3 prescribes the following five purchase methods under 
SAP: 
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1. Government-wide commercial purchase card (FAR 13.301) 
2. Purchase orders (FAR 13.302) 
3. Blanket purchase agreements (BPAs; FAR13.303) 
4. Imprest fund and third-party drafts (FAR 13.305) 
5. SF 44, purchase order invoice voucher (FAR 13.306) 
The monetary flexibility given in SAP for commercial and non-commercial items 
is given in Table 3, and a summary of other contingency process requirements is given in 
Appendix F.  
Table 3.   Simplified Acquisition Procedure Thresholds for Non-Commercial 
and Commercial Items (from FAR 13.5) 




Contingency 150,000.00 6,500,000.00 
Declared Contingency 300,000.00 12,000,000.00 
 
A commercial item means an item that is generally available in the market and 
accessible to general public. Commercial items can be purchased by any individual or a 
business entity from a commercial source who has either already sold the item in the 
market or offered it for sale. The detailed definition of the commercial item is given in 
FAR Part 2.1. The use of commercial items is preferred because of less market research 
involved compared to a unique item developed for government use (Straight, 2005).   
The FAR Subpart 13.2 treats purchases between the values of column (c) of Table 
4 and the SAP threshold, given above, as micro purchases (FAR 13.201). The FAR Para. 
13.201(g)(1) increases the micro-purchase threshold when an agency head determines 
that the purchased items will be used to support a contingency. 
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Table 4.   Micro-Purchase Thresholds in Non-Contingency and Contingency 
Environment (from FAR 13.201) 









Supply 3,000.00 15,000.00 Services 2,500.00 
Construction 2,000.00 - 
Overseas Supply/Services  30,000.00 
 
The increase in monetary thresholds of micro-purchases in a contingency 
environment provides flexibility and enhances efficiency in combat theater. It helps 
swiftly provide less costly items to warfighters. The spared time and resources can be 
diverted to other complicated acquisition cases. Yoder (2006), while comparing and 
contrasting SAP versus large contracting, is of the view that the SAP process from receipt 
of requirement until award of contract takes about 45 days at the Fleet and Industrial 
Supply Center (FISC) in San Diego, whereas it takes around 204 days under the large 
contracting process for the same activities. Yoder (2006) summarizes all the steps 
involved in both procurement processes in Figure 8. 
 
 Requisition Flow Overview (from Yoder, 2006, p. 80) Figure 8. 
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In the light of FAR Part 1.603-3(a), contracting officers are appointed to writing 
on SF1402. FAR Part 13.201(a) encourages agency heads to delegate micro-purchase 
authority. The FAR Part 1.603-3(b) permits micro-purchases by military members not 
appointed on SF1402. The members are, however, employed through written orders. 
These members can purchase items falling at or below the micro-purchase threshold by 
any of the above five purchase methods. 
The vendor bills, for items acquired through SAP, are processed faster than 
normal procedures. The payment, under SAP, is processed prior to the government’s 
verification of receipt and acceptance of acquired items. The payments are, however, 
subject to submission of shipment proof by the vendor. The rules bind the vendor to 
replace, repair, or correct the items not received at consignee end, damaged in-transit, or 
not in conformity with purchase orders (FAR 13.401(b)).  
FAR section 13.104 promotes competition to the maximum possible extent to 
purchase goods and services under SAP. It asks for best value purchase for the public 
money considering tradeoff between government cost and benefit. However, the 
contracting officer is forbidden to 
• solicit proposals based on personal favoritism (FAR 13.104(a)(1)), or 
• restrict solicitation of proposal to renowned vendors (FAR 13.104(a)(2)). 
The FAR section 5.003 envisages contracting officers to publish a notice on 
government-wide point of entry (GPE), an online resource to access information of the 
U.S. government opportunities beyond USD $25,000.00. However, the FAR section 
13.104 allows purchases by obtaining three quotations from sources within the local 
market. The FAR subsection 13.104-1 also stipulates that contracting officers consider 
the following while soliciting the competition: 
• The competitive nature of the good/service to be purchased 
• The non-availability of the online resource for widespread publication of 
the requirement 
• The urgency of the proposed purchase 
• The past market purchase experience. 
As discussed earlier, the SAP encourages contracting officers to obtain the best 
value for public money. The FAR paragraph 13.106-1(2) binds contracting officers to let 
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the potential bidders know the evaluation criteria for the award of the contract. The 
weight of relative importance, however, is not to be disclosed to the potential sellers.  
The FAR paragraph 13.106-1(b) permits solicitation of proposals from a single 
source brand name vendor for purchases within SAP threshold. Because this type of 
purchase practice restrict maximum practicable competition, the contracting officer has to 
determine and document the circumstances necessitating such a purchase. For purchases 
beyond the SAP threshold, the contracting officer must justify the needs and 
circumstances, besides getting approval. The contracting officer has to make 
justifications, prepared under Subpart 13.5, publicly available within 14 days of the 
award of the contract (FAR 13.501(a)(iii)). 
FAR paragraph 13.106-1(c) encourages a contracting officer to solicit oral 
proposals, to the maximum extent practicable, from potential sellers remaining within the 
SAP financial threshold beyond which oral solicitations are not allowed. The regulation 
desires that a contracting officer use discretion in opting for oral solicitations if electronic 
dissemination of information becomes cost ineffective. For oral solicitation, FAR 
paragraph 13.106-1(2) exempts publication of the notice on GPE. The regulation requires 
that written solicitations be issued only when obtaining oral or electronic proposals 
become inefficient or impracticable. 
The previous discussion about SAP demonstrates that SAP is an efficient, fast, 
and cost-effective procurement process. In his 2006 research, Yoder supports his 
argument with a USD(AT&L) memorandum, placed as Appendix G, in which the 
USD(AT&L) directs the acquisition workforce to increase the practice of commercial 
acquisition in order to swiftly meet the user requirements and reap the benefits of the 
efficiency of the SAP. Yoder (2006), concluding about the efficiency of the SAP, 
recommended that the USD(AT&L) make it mandatory for the acquisition workforce to 
utilize FAR 13.5 for items meeting the criteria of a commercial item, unless there is a 
compelling reason to believe that the requested good/service does not meet the criteria (p. 
99). 
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From the previous reflection on SAP, the reader can determine that the SAP 
simplifies the procurement process compared to large procurements. It enhances 
efficiency, conserves efforts, and increases support to warfighters in complex military 
environments where the gap between survival and death is marginal. The SAP also 
addresses procurement of commercial items used in a majority of complex military 
weapon systems. However, development of new military weapons or modification of 
existing military systems may at times be complex and different from commercial items. 
Such developments may be confidential so that advertisement at public forums may not 
be a viable option. In other cases, new development may require consultation/negotiation 
rounds with potential vendors for customized development. The United States has eased 
out of its procurement process by making negotiated contracts fall into the category of 
competitive contracts. The purpose of the later part of this study is to analyze 
negotiations under U.S. regulations and make the reader aware of how negotiations can 
be conducted in a corruption-free environment. 
J. NEGOTIATED PROCUREMENT 
Negotiated procurement is the award of a contract after reaching mutually agreed 
upon terms and conditions prior to the formal award of the contract. In the process of 
negotiations, the offerors are given fair chance to review and revise their proposal before 
final submission. FAR section 15.306(d) defines negotiations as follows: 
Negotiations are exchanges, in either a competitive or sole source 
environment, between the Government and offerors that are undertaken 
with the intent of allowing the offeror to revise its proposal. These 
negotiations may include bargaining. Bargaining includes persuasion, 
alteration of assumptions and positions, give-and-take, and may apply to 
price, schedule, technical requirements, type of contract, or other terms of 
a proposed contract. When negotiations are conducted in a competitive 
acquisition, they take place after establishment of the competitive range 
and are called discussions.  
1. Historical Perspective 
Sealed bidding was a primary form of procurement until 1947. The 1860 
Congress, through legislation, restricted military procurement to formal advertising only 
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and contract award to the lowest responsible and responsive bidder (Bates, 1960), with 
few exceptions as stated in Section 3709 of the revised statues: 
Unless otherwise provided in the appropriation concerned or other law, 
purchases and contracts for supplies or services for the Government may 
be made or entered into only after advertising a sufficient time previously 
for proposals, except (1) when the amount involved in any one case does 
not exceed $25,000, (2) when the public exigencies require the immediate 
delivery of the articles or performance of the service, (3) when only one 
source of supply is available and the Government purchasing or 
contracting officer shall so certify, or (4) when the services are required to 
be performed by the contractor in person and are (A) of a technical and 
professional nature or (B) under Government supervision and paid for on a 
time basis. Except (1) as authorized by section 29 of the Surplus Property 
Act of 1944 (50 U.S.C. App. 1638), (2) when otherwise authorized by law, 
or (3) when the reasonable value involved in any one case does not exceed 
$500, sales and contracts of sale by the Government shall be governed by 
the requirements of this section for advertising. In the case of wholly 
owned Government corporations, this section shall apply to their 
administrative transactions only. (41 U.S.C. § 3709) 
World Wars I and II played pivotal roles in transition from formal advertisement 
to negotiations as part of war preparedness. Both wars required massive production by 
local U.S. industry in support of warfighters. On July 28, 1917, the U.S. government 
established a War Industries Board (WIB) as part of preparations for WWI. The WIB was 
established to coordinate and control local industry for materialization of military 
requirements (Beede, 2014). Beede (2014) is of the view that the board often negotiated 
with local industry instead of giving directions. Thus, the beginning of negotiations, in 
government contracting, can be traced to WIB.  
In 1930, the War Policies Commission recommended replacement of formal 
advertisement with negotiated procurement in government contracting (Manuel, 2011, p. 
4). In 1940, Congress enacted Public Law 671, also known as the Speed-Up Law, to 
match the pace of industrial development with government acquisition. The Speed-Up 
Law allowed negotiated procurement with 17 exceptions and was subject to review and 
approval by a services secretary.  
Until 1947, the mix and match of formal advertisement continued when Congress 
formally enacted the Armed Services Procurement Act (ASPA). The ASPA was 
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administered with 17 exceptions. Since the enacting of the ASPA, the quantum of 
negotiated contracts has continuously increased.  According to Cibinic, Nash, and Yukins 
(2011), presently only 10% of federal spending involves sealed bidding, whereas the 
remaining budget is spent on negotiated procurement. 
2. Advantages and Disadvantages of Negotiated Procurement 
The negotiated procurement has advantages and disadvantages. The negotiations 
may be helpful when 
• Procurement of goods/services is not structured or is less structured. It 
may involve development of new weapon systems, construction, or 
architectural designs.  
• A contract is to be awarded on an emergent basis in the wake of natural 
calamity where time to publicize may result in loss of lives. 
• Modification of existing resources is required to save lives of personnel 
involved in armed conflict. This may include conversion of military 
vehicles from non-armor to armor-protected vehicles required to save 
military personnel from improvised explosive devices (IEDs) splinters. 
• Technical specifications are to be kept confidential due to national security 
importance. 
The disadvantages of negotiated procurement may involve but may not be limited 
to 
• conflict of interest of any person involved in the contracting process, 
• lessening of transparency in contract award process, or 
• exorbitant costs due to faulty negotiations or lack of legal framework to 
audit supplier’s cost and price methodology. 
3. Best Value Quantum 
As discussed earlier, the U.S. government places a great deal of importance on 
best value quantum in government procurement. The negotiated procurement is based on 
the tradeoff between cost and other factors that may result in savings of taxpayers’ 
dollars. FAR subpart 15.101 describes the best value continuum as follows: 
An agency can obtain best value in negotiated acquisitions by using any 
one or a combination of source selection approaches. In different types of 
acquisitions, the relative importance of cost or price may vary. For 
example, in acquisitions where the requirement is clearly definable and the 
risk of unsuccessful contract performance is minimal, cost or price may 
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play a dominant role in source selection. The less definitive the 
requirement, the more development work required, or the greater the 
performance risk, the more technical or past performance considerations 
may play a dominant role in source selection. 
4. Negotiations Process 
Currently, U.S. regulations allow procurement of goods and services through an 
IFB, previously known as formal advertising, and RFPs. The primary difference between 
sealed bidding and negotiated procurement are the oral and written discussions with the 
offerors prior to award of the contract. The statutory procedures for sealed bidding are 
available in 10 U.S.C. Section 2305 and 41 U.S.C. Section 3702. In view of FAR Subpart 
14.101, the sealed bidding process involves 
(a) preparation of IFBs, 
(b) publication of IFBs, 
(c) submission of bids, 
(d) evaluation of bids, and 
(e) contract award. 
Upon receipt of the procurement requirement, the contracting officer has to study 
the requirement and select the procurement methodology between sealed bidding and 
negotiations. The selection of procurement methodology is based on the technical nature 
of an item, and the past purchase experience and availability of the item in the market. 
The contracting officer prepares the bidding document specifying each evaluation criteria 
and publicizes the requirement on the GPE. The received bids are opened publicly at a 
specified time and venue, evaluated on prescribed evaluation criteria, and the contract is 
awarded on the basis of price to the responsible bidder without any discussion prior to the 
award of the formal contract. Due to process clarity, the sealed bidding contract award is 
the most transparent mechanism that minimizes chances of fraud, collusion, and conflict 
of interest.  
When the contracting officer decides to purchase goods/services through RFPs, 
the contracting officer has to be diligent in every procurement step. The different steps 
involved in negotiated procurement process are detailed below. 
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a. Preparation for Requests for Proposal  
Pursuant to 41 U.S.C. section 253(a), FAR Parts 11.002 and 15.2, the contracting 
officer is to plan the procurement, before invitation of proposal, in a manner that 
maximizes full and open competition. The advance preparation involves back-and-forth 
exchanges of information with technical users, as well as potential vendors. The 
exchange of information helps increase understanding of all stakeholders about 
government needs, purchase of quality goods, and best offers.  
As mentioned in the FAR paragraph 15.201(c), these exchanges of information 
can be held in pre-RFPs conferences, public meetings, market research, one-on-one 
meetings, pre-solicitation notices, draft RFPs, RFIs, and site visits. The FAR, however, 
desires that a fair competitive environment is to be provided to all potential vendors. Any 
information provided to a vendor needs to be shared with the general public in a manner 
that does not disclose proprietary/private information of a vendor (FAR 15.201(f)). 
The primary difference between IFBs and RFPs is the show of intent by the 
contracting officer as to whether the contract will be awarded on the basis of negotiated 
price or otherwise.  
In the light of FAR 15.203(a), an RFP needs to contain 
(a) the government’s requirement; 
(b) anticipated contract terms and conditions; 
(c) authority to propose alternative terms and conditions, including the 
contract line item number (CLIN); when CLIN is permitted, effects 
on other terms and conditions are also required to be assessed; 
(d) information mandatorily required in the offer; and 
(e) significant evaluation factors/sub factor, like performance capacity, 
past experience and past performance, along with their relative 
weightage points. 
41 U.S.C. section 3306 (c)(1)(C) and 10 U.S.C. section 2305(a) require RFPs to 
contain the following requirements for easy decision-making. 
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The RFPs shall disclose to offerors whether all evaluation factors other 
than cost or price, when combined are: 
(a) significantly more important than cost or price; 
(b) approximately equal in importance to cost or price; or 
(c) significantly less important than cost or price.  
b. Publication on Government-Wide Point of Entry  
The Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) Act, 41 U.S.C. section 416, 15 
U.S.C. section 637(e) of the Small Businesses Act, and FAR subpart 5.003 and 
5.102(a)(1) require a contracting community to prepare a synopsis of government 
requirements and publicize all requirements on a single online GPE source for all 
procurements exceeding USD $25,000. In light of FAR Subpart 15.203(a), the synopsis 
must be published at least 15 days prior to issuance of solicitations, though there are 
some exceptions prescribed in the same subpart that reduces the number of days. The 
number of days are counted from the date of publication of synopsis on GPE. 
c. Solicitation 
After issuance of solicitations, all potential vendors are given a reasonable 
timeframe to submit their best bids. FAR paragraph 5.203(b) permits contracting officers 
to use discretion in solicitation response time, depending upon complexity, commercial 
availability, urgency, and circumstances of each acquisition case. The FAR asks for 
provisions of reasonable response timeframe for commercial items exceeding USD 
$25,000. Other than commercial items, the law requires at least 30 days response time 
from the date of issuance of solicitations, making a total of 45 days from the date of 
publication of notice on GPE. However, under the World Trade Organization (WTO), the 
submission time cannot be less than 40 days for WTO GPA covered cases. Since release 
of the solicitation, the contracting officer acts as a focal point for any kind of 
communication between technical users and potential suppliers. 
d. Source Selection 
FAR Subpart 15.3 deals with the source selection process. FAR Subsection 
15.303 assigns source selection responsibility to an agency head. It designates the 
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contracting officer as the source selection authority unless anyone else is designated by 
an agency head. Said subpart envisages an evaluation team tailored for the particular 
acquisition case. The team may consist of legal, logistics, technical, and other experts for 
all-inclusive evaluation of the received proposals. The contracting officer is to ensure 
evaluation of the proposals on the basis of factors/sub-factors prescribed in the RFPs. He 
or she is also responsible for award of the contract to the source whose proposal brings 
best value to the government. 
The proposal evaluation process shortlists the potential offeror, based on 
capability to perform the contract successfully. The source selection authority assesses 
strengths, weaknesses, and risks of each offeror based on the evaluation factors/sub 
factors. The evaluation parameters are to be documented for subsequent debriefing of the 
unsuccessful offerors and for future reference purposes. In past examples exists where 
rejected offerors registered post-award protests to the GAO, as witnessed in Halloway vs. 
the U.S. government, where rejected offerors protested with the GAO, as well as with the 
U.S. Court of Claims. In said case, the contracting officer defended himself on the basis 
of his notes, which were documented at the time of award of the contract.  
In negotiated procurement, the source selection authority has to provide fair 
chance for resubmission of proposals based on discussions, clarifications, and significant 
weaknesses found during the evaluation process. However, after closure of the 
discussion, the contracting officer decides on a cut-off date for submission of the final 
proposals. During these exchanges of information, the government team has to remain 
impartial as envisaged in Procurement Integrity Act. 
FAR Subpart 15.5 deals with pre-award, award, and post-award formalities of 
government-negotiated procurement. According to FAR section 15.505, before formal 
award of the contract to the successful offeror, the contracting officer has to notify all 
offerors excluded from competition. The excluded offerors have a right to request pre-
award debriefing within three days of the receipt of the notice of exclusion from 
competition. The pre-award briefings have to contain at least the following: 
(a) Assessment of the offer on the basis of significant factors 
(b) Reasons for rejection from competition 
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(c) Reasonable answers to offeror’s questions. (FAR 15.505(e)) 
e. Award 
Final proposals are evaluated on the basis of factors/sub factors, and the contract 
is awarded to the offeror with best value to the government. The contract award rationale 
is to be documented for reasons discussed earlier. 
f. Post Award  
The unsuccessful offerors can request a debrief within three days of receipt of 
notification from the contracting officer. The debriefing is to be held within five days of 
the receipt of the request. The contracting officer is to chair the debriefing of the offeror 
and the rest of the evaluation team is to support him. Debriefing is to contain at least the 
following: 
(a) Assessment of the offer on the basis of significant factors 
(b) The overall evaluated cost and price gap between successful 
offeror and debriefed offeror 
(c) The overall grading of all of the offerors 
(d) The reasons for the award to successful offeror 
(e) The make and model of the commercial item to be delivered by 
successful offeror 
(f) Reasonable answers to offeror’s questions (FAR 15.506(d)) 
g. Documentation  
FAR Part 15.406 pertains to documentation involved in the negotiation process. 
According to FAR paragraph 15.406-1, the contracting officer has to set pre-negotiation 
objectives regarding reasonableness of price inconsideration of market research, audit 
reports, and government-based independent cost estimates. FAR Part 15.406-1(b) 
envisages the contracting officer to pre-determine the negotiation issues to be discussed 
during negotiation process, the cost, and the price objectives. 
FAR Part 15.406-2 refers to a written certificate to be submitted by contractors for 
correctness of the cost and pricing data. The FAR also provides an exact format of the 
certificate (see Appendix H) to be submitted by the vendor. 
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FAR paragraph 15.406-3 guides documenting principal elements of the 
negotiations, for example, a price negotiation memorandum (PNM). It envisages 
documentation to include the purpose of the negotiation, description of the item being 
purchased, particulars of the representatives of government and contractor, the exception 
used for not excluding cost and price data, and so forth. U.S. military services have 
developed different procedures and guidelines to document pre-negotiation objectives 
and price negotiations memoranda. As an example, different checklists of the U.S. Army 
are attached in Appendix I (OSD, 2004). 
Negotiations are uncertain processes. Negotiators on both sides remain 
apprehensive of not achieving their desired objectives. The parties do not have any 
knowledge of the bottom line of the other party. However, Hegarty and Sims (1978), are 
of the view that the negotiation situation improves with repeated interaction as trust 
increases with sharing of information. 
K. TRUTH IN NEGOTIATIONS ACT 
The U.S. government has protected itself and its acquisition community from 
negotiations’ insecurities by enacting the Truth in Negotiations Act (TINA) in September 
1962, with an objective to ascertain reasonable cost and price of an item, and to avoid 
procurement at inflated prices. Prior to enacting of TINA, contractors were not required 
to disclose the cost and price data while submitting the proposals. Maddox (2013) is of 
the view that the roots of TINA lie in the Korean War when President Harry S. Truman, 
through a proclamation, relaxed formal advertisement requirements by allowing 
negotiated procurement to meet the warfighters’ requirements on an emergency basis. 
The resultant increase in dollar value of DOD contracts raised concerns in Congress and 
paved the way for an amendment of the ASPA that permitted comptroller to audit 
contractors’ records. According to Maddox (2013), the TINA became a source to provide 
the same level of pricing knowledge to a government negotiator as to a contractor’s 
negotiator. 
10 U.S.C Section 2306(a) authorizes contracting officers to obtain cost and 
pricing data from potential offerors by specifying the need for the data in procurements 
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rather than sealed bidding. The vendors have to certify that the provided data is accurate, 
complete, and current, lest the government, entitled to reduce the contract price, recover 
any over-payment made during the performance of the contract. 
Initially, the government recovered only the excess payment; however, in 1985, 
Congress added two provisions to ensure larger compliance from vendors. These 
included recovery of interest from the date of overpayment until repayment, and 
assessment of penalty if the contractor is found in knowledge of defective pricing 
(Cooper, 1993).  
Submission and certification is required for a contract, subcontract, or 
modification of an existing contract beyond USD $650,000, as well as beyond SAP 
thresholds, unless an exception applies. FAR paragraph 15.403-1(b) provides the 
following exceptions, which forbid a contracting officer from obtaining cost and price 
data when 
• prices are based on adequate competition; 
• prices are set by law or regulation; 
• purchase involves commercial item; 
• waiver has been granted; and 
• the existing contract is being modified. 
FAR 15.403-2 provides the following additional circumstances when certified 
cost and pricing data is not required: 
• when solicitation does not require submission of cost and price data; and 
• when overrun funding or interim billing price is being adjusted. 
When any of the above exceptions exist, FAR section 15.402 authorizes 
contracting officers to obtain data other than cost and price to ascertain price 
reasonability. However, the FAR forbids contracting officers from obtaining information 
that is beyond “necessary.” A question arises: what kind of information can be obtained 
from a vendor under the ambit of cost/price that is necessary to assess price/cost 
reasonableness? FAR Part 2.101 provides an answer while defining cost or pricing data, 
as follows: 
Cost or pricing data” (10 U.S.C. 2306a(h)(1) and 41 U.S.C. chapter 35) 
means all facts that, as of the date of price agreement, or, if applicable, an 
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earlier date agreed upon between the parties that is as close as practicable 
to the date of agreement on price, prudent buyers and sellers would 
reasonably expect to affect price negotiations significantly. Cost or pricing 
data are factual, not judgmental; and are verifiable. While they do not 
indicate the accuracy of the prospective contractor’s judgment about 
estimated future costs or projections, they do include the data forming the 
basis for that judgment. Cost or pricing data are more than historical 
accounting data; they are all the facts that can be reasonably expected to 
contribute to the soundness of estimates of future costs and to the validity 
of determinations of costs already incurred. They also include, but are not 
limited to, such factors as— 
1. Vendor quotations; 
2. Nonrecurring costs; 
3. Information on changes in production methods and in production or 
purchasing volume; 
4. Data supporting projections of business prospects and objectives and 
related opinions costs; 
5. Unit-cost trends such as those associated with labor efficiency; 
6. Make-or-buy decisions; 
7. Estimated resources to attain business goals; and 
8. Information on management decisions that could have a significant 
bearing on costs. 
In the views of Maddox (2013), the TINA is unique in a sense that, during 
negotiations between two private parties, none discloses cost and pricing data; thus, the 
negotiations environment lacks trust, whereas, in negotiations of a government purchase, 
both parties have the same level of knowledge, and the contractor is held accountable for 
any willful deception of cost and pricing data. 
L. SUMMARY OF THE COMPARISON BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES 
AND PAKISTAN ACQUISITION PROCESSES 
There are similarities as well as differences in the acquisition process of the 
United States and Pakistan. The roots of negotiated contracting are traceable to WWI and 
WWII and it has been in practice ever since then. Over time, the United States has 
evolved checks and balances that keep the negotiations process transparent. The 
competitive negotiated form of contracting can be initiated in Pakistan; however, there is 
a need to embed checks and balances in the accountability loop to avoid corrupt 
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practices. The comparison of the processes is summarily tabulated in Appendix J for easy 
understanding of the readers. 
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V. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This chapter builds on previous chapters to identify focal areas of the Pakistan 
procurement system for enhancement in the efficacy of the procurement system. We 
draw analogies from the U.S. procurement system to address the weaknesses in the public 
procurement system in Pakistan. An important relevant fact of this chapter is that 
Pakistan is an importing country, whereas the United States thrives on material exports, 
including military equipment, to various countries, including Pakistan.  
The procurement agencies of both countries interact with each other on different 
forums, like Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and various other programs. These 
interactions are held at an unlevelled playing field because there exist many gaps between 
the two countries. Primarily, these gaps revolve around three procurement tiers: 
personnel, platform, and protocol, as discussed later in this chapter. 
Chapter IV, an overview of the U.S acquisition system, enlightened readers that in 
the United States, negotiated contracts are an integral part of competitive procurement 
process, which has been practiced since WWII. The competition concept in negotiated 
procurement revolves around procurement methodology selected by a contracting officer. 
The regulations encourage the contracting community to use judgement at all 
procurement stages while optimizing the value of taxpayers’ dollars during procurement 
of goods and services for the U.S. government. Judgement begins from the show of intent 
while soliciting RFPs, flows through the source selection process, and culminates with 
contract award. 
The transparency in legal protocols serves as a balancing deterrent force that 
minimizes inefficiencies and increases outputs in negotiated procurement. For example, 
according to the U.S. regulations, the contracting officers have to debrief rejected bidders 
after exclusion from the competitive source selection process and before formal award of 
the contract. Based on the debriefing, the unsatisfied offerors have the right to lodge a 
protest with the procurement agency, the GAO, and the U.S. Court of Claims. 
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The TINA closes the balancing deterrence loop by encompassing suppliers in the 
accountability loop of government procurement. Under the rules and regulations, 
discussed in Chapter IV, suppliers involved in business with the government have to 
submit cost and price data to a contracting officer if solicited in RFPs. The vendors have 
to certify the correctness, completeness, and currency of their data.  
The law gives authority to contracting officers to seek data other than cost and 
price to ascertain price reasonableness. The regulations also provide rights to comptroller 
to audit vendors’ records and ascertain the authenticity and correctness of their records.  
The above discussion supports that negotiated procurement, because a 
competitive procurement methodology is a doable option provided weaknesses, discussed 
subsequently, in three procurement pillars (personnel, platforms, and protocols) are 
addressed to safeguard government interests in public procurement. This enhances 
efficiency in public procurement and effectiveness in the implementation of legal 
framework. 
A. ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENTS—PERSONNEL 
In the United States, the AT&L community is recognized as a specialist stream 
within the military supply corps of services. The law requires AT&L works to undergo 
different qualifications before appointment against some vacancies. The legal binding, in 
place, helps the DOD request regular funding from Congress for training and capacity 
building of the workforce. In fulfillment of legal discourse, superior officers are also 
bound to spare their subordinates for training and certification courses. Due to sustained 
training, the AT&L community has been recognized as the most qualified professional 
workforce in the DOD. The educational qualifications provide the requisite skills 
necessary for added advantage in professional handling of contract negotiations, 
administration, monitoring, and oversight of suppliers. 
In Pakistan, the contracting workforce is not recognized as a specialist 
professional stream. Instead, non-contracting professionals are appointed for contracting 
duties. The non-recognition as a specialist workforce adversely effects sustained training 
and professional capacity building of contracting personnel. As a result, such personnel 
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are at a disadvantage when they carry out contracting duties at a local and international 
level. 
B. ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENTS—PLATFORMS 
In the United States, the acquisition platform improved due to combined efforts of 
government, Congress, and military services. From the preceding work, it is evident that 
Congress actively kept itself relevant to the development of legal framework of 
government procurement in the United States. Likewise, the president of the United 
States has convened different boards, like the Blue Ribbon Commission. These boards 
questioned the early methodology of DOD procurement; their recommendations were 
subsequently enacted as regulations that helped improved government procurement 
process. Similarly, armed services contributed to the growth of the acquisition platform 
by establishing organizations like the DLA, DCMA, DAU, and NPS. These organizations 
help shape the future of the acquisition community, in particular by imparting education 
and skill development, and in general by enhancing support to their warfighters.  
Pakistan lacks such activism on the part of government pillars. Parliament rarely 
involves itself in the capacity building of contracting personnel. The only active 
organization in Pakistan that raises questions on procurement actions is the Pakistan 
Accountability Commission (PAC), a counterpart of the GAO; however, the PAC has 
never raised any question related to capacity building of the acquisition community. The 
responsibility for training of the procurement community rests solely with armed services 
chiefs who meet the training requirement from scarce organizational funding. Because 
there is no legal framework that mandates that superior officers complete certifications 
levels like those of the DAWIA, the training funding varies from time to time. As a 
result, the capacity building of the contracting community remains below the desired 
level. Although the Pakistan National Procurement Strategy envisages interaction with a 
local university for the promotion of studies in the contracting field, credible measures 
are yet to be put in place. 
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C. ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENTS—PROTOCOLS 
From Chapter IV, it is evident that the U.S. acquisition regulations evolved 
primarily to accommodate wartime requirements during WWI and WWII. Before these 
wars, the U.S. government procured goods/services through sealed bidding. However, to 
accommodate new developments and modification of customized unprecedented wartime 
requirements, Congress amended regulations and enacted new laws to streamline 
negotiated procurement. As evident from the preceding work, the TINA incorporated 
vendors involved in business with the U.S. government into the legal framework. This 
expansion placed a 360-degree check and balance on all stakeholders involved in 
government procurement. The incorporation of vendors in the accountability loop and the 
protection of whistleblower’s rights significantly reduced malpractices associated with 
negotiated procurement. 
During the process of evolution, the acquisition regulations may have become 
complex for some contracting professionals; however, it should be appreciated that the 
FAR regulations delve in depth into policies and procurement procedures. The 
advantages are numerous. Firstly, the detailed guidelines available in the FAR enhance 
the confidence of contracting personnel because the FAR provides the requisite 
guidelines. Secondly, the detailed guidelines help contracting officers avoid any 
unintentional mistakes that may cause individual, organizational, or national 
embarrassment. 
Since September 11, 2001, establishment of the PPRA in 2002, and enacting of 
PPRA Rules 2004, the situation in Pakistan has significantly changed. Primarily, 
UNCITRAL model law was amended in 2011. The modified UNCITRAL law allows 
negotiated procurement, but PPRA rules still follow the 1994 UNCITRAL law. Secondly, 
Pakistan has been participating in the Global War on Terror for almost a decade. During 
the last decade, Pakistan also faced natural disasters, like the 2005 earthquake and the 
2010 and 2011 floods. Pakistan armed services were called to aid civil government in 
restoring peace, Internally Displaced Peoples (IDPs), and rehabilitation efforts. These 
unprecedented events generated a number of demands that required customized 
developments on a case-to-case basis. Because the PPRA regulations allow government 
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procurement through sealed bidding, considerable time was required for publicizing and 
submitting proposals in a reasonable timeframe. As a result, a number of requirements 
were processed through waiver certifications on the pretext of national contingencies. 
Such procurements essentially reduced the essence of fair and transparent government 
procurement and raised the chances of malpractices and kickbacks. 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the above findings, it is recommended that PPRA rules may be modified 
to incorporate negotiated procurement as a competitive form of government procurement, 
as is in practice in the United States. However, the following credible actions are to be 
taken by government of Pakistan before sanctioning negotiated procurement: 
1. Short-Run Actions 
a. Personnel 
• Recognize contracting as a specialist professional stream in all federal 
government departments through concrete legislative measures approved 
by the Parliament of Pakistan. 
• Enhance the skill level of contracting professionals through special 
financial allocations for the next five years for master’s and PhD programs 
from U.S. institutes like the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in the field 
of contracting/acquisition. 
b. Platforms 
• Mandate that federal government departments develop a career 
progression pyramid of contracting personnel. A minimum certification 
level may also be formulated as qualification for appointments at different 
echelons of the pyramid. 
• Establish contracting/acquisition departments in existing universities in 
Pakistan for capacity building of existing contracting personnel. 
• Initiate certification/short-term diploma courses from existing universities 
for immediate capacity building of personnel deployed on contracting 
desk jobs. 
c. Protocols 
• Provide protection to whistleblowers, as is available in the U.S. 
regulations. A share in recovered government money will incentivize and 
protect government interest in at least two manners. Firstly, it will serve as 
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a deterrent to corrupt practices because government officials/vendors will 
be afraid of whistle blows by colleagues/employees of vendors. Secondly, 
the incentive will help recover public money that was misappropriated in 
past. 
• Authorize audit authorities to audit records of government contractors by 
bringing government suppliers into the accountability loop. 
• Authorize contracting personnel to seek cost/pricing data to ascertain price 
reasonableness.  
• Authorize negotiated procurement in the Ministry of Defense and National 
Disaster Management Agency (NDMA) as a pilot project for next five 
years.  
• Give the PPRA a mandate to carry out audit of contracts awarded by 
federal government agencies to ascertain adherence of the regulations. 
2. Long-Run Measures 
• Plan, establish, and open an independent acquisition university in the next 
five years. Personnel trained through short-term measures may be utilized 
to further groom future generations of contracting professionals. 
• Develop rules and regulations customized/trimmed to government 
acquisition in the peculiar environment of Pakistan through legislature. 
• Provide flexibility in procurement thresholds under contingent/emergency 
situation, as seen in the shape of SAP thresholds. 
• Assess viability for adoption of the FAR and TINA in Pakistan. 
• Develop a methodology to review and update Pakistan procurement 
regulations on a regular basis, preferably through an online mechanism. 
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APPENDIX A. ORGANIZATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
 
(from Department of Defense, 2012)
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APPENDIX B. OVERVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
PLANNING, PROGRAMMING, BUDGETING, AND EXECUTION 
SYSTEM 
 
(from AcqNotes, 2015)) 
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APPENDIX C. ORGANIZATION CHART OF THE UNDER 
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APPENDIX D. COMPETITIVE PROCEDURES RESULTING IN 
FULL AND OPEN COMPETITION 
 
 
(from Manuel, 2011) 
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APPENDIX E. CIRCUMSTANCES PERMITTING OTHER THAN 
FULL AND OPEN COMPETITION 
 
 
(from Manuel, 2011, p. 11) 
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APPENDIX F. SUMMARY OF CONTINGENCY PROCESS REQUIREMENTS 
 
(from DOD, 2012, p. 80) 
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(from Gansler, J.S, 2001) 
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APPENDIX H. CERTIFICATE OF COST OR PRICING DATA 
This is to certify that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, the cost or pricing data (as 
defined in section 2.101 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and required under 
FAR subsection 15.403-4) submitted, either actually or by specific identification in 
writing, to the Contracting Officer or to the Contracting Officer's representative in 
support of ________* are accurate, complete, and current as of ________**. This 
certification includes the cost or pricing data supporting any advance agreements and 
forward pricing rate agreements between the offeror and the Government that are part of 






Date of execution***________________________________ 
 
* Identify the proposal, request for price adjustment, or other submission involved, giving 
the appropriate identifying number (e.g., RFP No.). 
 
** Insert the day, month, and year when price negotiations were concluded and price 
agreement was reached or, if applicable, an earlier date agreed upon between the parties 
that is as close as practicable to the date of agreement on price. 
 
*** Insert the day, month, and year of signing, which should be as close as practicable to 
the date when the price negotiations were concluded and the contract price was agreed to. 
 
(from FAR 15.406-2, 2015)  
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APPENDIX I. U.S. ARMY CONTRACTING AGENCY (ACA) PRE-
/POST-NEGOTIATION DOCUMENTATION SAMPLES 
Sample 1 
 
SAMPLE FORMAT – COMPETITIVE COMMERCIAL – TYPE SERVICES 
PRENEGOTIATION OBJECTIVE MEMORANDUM (POM) 
GROUND MAINTENANCE – LAWN MOWING 
FORT FUTURE 
 
I. Solicitation Number:  DABTXX-02-R-0000, including 3 amendments. 
 
II. Contract Type:  Insert contract type and period of performance. Include any options 
for additional performance. 
 
III. Description of Requirement:  Provide a brief description of the supplies or services 
being acquired.  
 
IV. Acquisition Background: 
 
a. Previous buys of same or similar items. 
b. Applicability of performance based contracting approaches. 
c. Consideration for consolidation with regional requirements and any 
“bundling” issues. 
d. Market Research results.  Discuss the basis for making the commercial items 
determination and any actions to reevaluate the requirement to enable use of 
commercial or no developmental items.  Identify any relevant contract terms 
and conditions and industry practices discovered during market research. 
e. Efforts to identify potential sources.  Address set-aside decisions or decisions 
to limit competition. 
f. Any external conditions that may affect the requirement and acquisition. 
g. Availability of funding. 
 
V. Acquisition Chronology:  (Provide a brief discussion of significant acquisition 
events.) 
 
a. Receipt of Requisition or Purchase Order.  (If current action is definitizing a 
Letter Contract or other unpriced action, insert date it was issued.) 
b. J&A Approval, if applicable.  
c. Approval of the Acquisition Plan and Source Selection Plan, if applicable. 
d. Issuance of any Draft RFP or meetings with industry not discussed under 
market research. 
e. Date of synopsis. 
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f. Date solicitation issued, and any amendments to the solicitation. 
g. Date proposals were received.  Summarize number of proposals received. 
h. If adequate price competition does not exist, summarize actions to evaluate 
the proposal, Field Pricing Support and DCAA Audits, and fact-finding 
activities.  See the Army Contracting Agency Cost & Price Analysis 
Handbook for specific guidance. 
 




Specialist: _________________ Title __________________ Date__________ 
 
Reviewed by: 
   Contracting 
   Officer: _________________ Title __________________ Date__________ 
 
   Legal*:_________________ Title __________________ Date__________ 
 
   DOC*:_________________ Title __________________ Date__________ 
 
   Other: _________________ Title __________________ Date__________ 
 
Approved by: _________________ Title __________________ Date__________ 
 
*Only include/use Legal and DOC signature lines when required by the 





VI. Approval of this POM authorizes discussions/negotiations to begin with Company A, 
Company B, and Company C, based on the competitive range determination, as defined 
below.  Also, approval of this POM authorizes the Contracting Officer to notify 
Company D and Company E that their proposals are not within the competitive range and 
they are excluded from further consideration and are entitled to receive a debriefing by 
the Contracting Officer. 
 
a. Basis for Award: 
 
Award will be based on the best value approach specified in AFARS 5115.101 – 
Best Value Continuum.  Section M (attached) advises competitors that Technical, 
Management, and Past Performance factors are all equal in importance, and together are 
more important than price.  (List evaluation factors and relative importance of each to the 




List offerors, proposed prices, and ratings for each 
evaluation factor.  Use a break line to show competitive 
range.  When cost analysis or cost/price realism analysis is 
required or performed, include a columnar format breakout 
of the major cost elements of each contractor’s proposal 
and the analysis (i.e., labor cost, direct cost, indirect cost, 
profit/fee).  The analysis can be attached, but prices should 
still be included here.  Use rating factors in Chapter 5 of the 




 Proposed Technical Management Past 
Offeror Price Rating Rating
 Performance 
 
Company A $1,950,000 Good Good Good 
Company B $2,000,000 Good Excellent Good 
Company C $2,050,500 Good Good Marginal 
 
-------------------------- (Competitive Range) ----------------------------------- 
 
Company D $10,000,000 Unsatisfactory Marginal Marginal 
Company E $998,800 Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory Not Rated 
 
c. Price Reasonableness and Cost Realism Analysis.   
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Describe the method and basis for determining price reasonableness of the 
proposals, in accordance with FAR Subpart 15.403-1.  Identify the sources of information 
used in reaching the determination.  Sources of information may include the Independent 
Government Cost Estimate, pricing information obtained during Market Research, prices 
for the same or similar items previously acquired, published catalogs and price lists, and 
information provided by the offerors.  If prices are reasonable based on adequate price 
competition, explain the need for any cost or pricing data from the offerors.  Discuss 
other uses of cost or pricing information, such as in performing a cost realism analysis or 
in developing a most probable cost to the Government estimate.  
 
d. Competitive Range Determination.  
 
After completing review of initial proposals, the following offerors were 
determined to not be within the group of those most highly rated for the reasons 
indicated, and will be excluded from the competitive range.  
 
(NOTE: Use or establishment of an “efficient” competitive range CANNOT 




(1) Company D is excluded from the competitive range because deficiencies and 
shortcomings noted during the evaluation indicate a lack of understanding of the 
requirement.  The proposed price was unreasonably high in comparison with the other 
offerors and the technical/management proposals were rated unacceptable.  The proposal 
is rated lower than those that are most highly rated.  Detailed deficiencies are included in 
the evaluation summary (Enclosure 1).  (Specific information can be included here or by 
attachment.) 
 
(2) Company E’s proposal is excluded from the competitive range because its 
proposed price was unrealistically low and the technical and management proposals 
demonstrate a lack of understanding of the requirement.  Detailed deficiencies are 
included in the evaluation summary (Enclosure 2).  (Specific information can be included 
here or as an attachment.) 
 
e. Issues that will be discussed with the offerors in the competitive range. 
 
(1) Identify any deficiencies, significant weaknesses, and concerns with each of 
the offerors that will be covered in discussions.  These would include considerations that 
could affect the evaluation rating of an evaluation factor and may apply to cost or price 
and past performance, as well as technical and management factors.  
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(2) Identify significant strengths in each offeror’s proposal, so that the offeror will 
know not to remove a desirable provision in its final revision that would reduce the value 
of its offer. 
 
(3) The Government is not required to discuss the same topics with all of the 
offerors in the competitive range.  However, discussion topics must relate to evaluation 
factors in the solicitation and the Government may not favor one offeror over another, 
reveal an offeror’s solution to another offeror, reveal an offeror’s price without the 
offeror’s permission, disclose source selection information, or reveal the name of 




Include only attachments that are necessary to support negotiation objectives, 
negotiation issues, and competitive range determinations.  Attach Sections L & M of the 
RFP and the Source Selection Evaluation Plan, however do not include proposals, 
proposal cover sheets, or audits.  Only include cost/price, technical, management, past 
performance, and subcontracting plan evaluation documents when the subject cannot be 
adequately covered by a summary statement in the body of the POM.  When in doubt, do 
not include information that may be proprietary or source selection sensitive.  If needed, 






(SAMPLE FORMAT – COMPETITIVE COMMERCIAL – TYPE SERVICES) 
 
POST NEGOTIATION MEMORANDUM (PNM) 
 




I.  Solicitation Number: DABTXX-02-R-0000 
 
II. Contract Type:  Insert contract type and period of performance. Include any options 
for additional performance. 
 
III. Description of Requirement:  See description from POM. 
 
IV. Acquisition Background:  Summarize information from POM, updated to include the 
results of source selection activities. 
 
V.  Basis for Award:  Summarize the major factors in the Source Selection and their 
relative importance.  Briefly describe the proposals in the competitive range and the 
tradeoffs that led to the Source Selection Decision.  If the PNM is a standalone document, 
it must track with the Source Selection Decision Document. 
 




Specialist: _________________ Title __________________ Date__________ 
 
Reviewed by: 
   Contracting 
   Officer: _________________ Title __________________ Date__________ 
 
   Legal*:_________________ Title __________________ Date__________ 
 
   DOC*:_________________ Title __________________ Date__________ 
 
   Other: _________________ Title __________________ Date__________ 
 
Approved by: _______________ Title __________________ Date__________ 
 
* Only include/use SJA and DOC signature lines when required by the ACA, 




VI. Participants in Discussions/Negotiations with each of the Offerors: 
 
a. Face-to-face negotiations were conducted 2-5 August 2002 at the Fort Future 
DOC office.   
 
b. (List discussion topics for each offeror or include as an attachment.  Explain any 
differences from the topics in the POM.) 
 





John Doe Pres. XYZ, Inc. 
Jane Jones Contracting Officer, Fort Future 
Jack Smith Legal Advisor, Fort Future 
_____________________ ____________________________   
_____________________ ____________________________ 
 
Note:  If written discussions were held instead of face-to-face or telephonic, 
include names/title/organization of those who signed correspondence. 
 
VII.  Results of Negotiations/Discussion:  
 
For each offeror in the competitive range, list the topics identified for discussions 
in the POM.  Provide and explanation as to why any of these topics were not addressed in 
discussions and describe the basis for inclusion of any new topics.  Discuss any questions 
and clarification requests received from each offeror.  Describe each offeror’s response to 
questions and to any proposal deficiencies and significant weaknesses provided by the 
Government during discussions.  Finally, relate how information exchanged during 
discussions/negotiations were reflected in each offeror’s revised proposal.  Attach any 
correspondence, transcripts, or memoranda documenting the discussions. 
 
VIII.  Source Selection Decision Statement:  If the PNM serves as the Source Selection 
Decision Document, include a statement similar to the example below, which is based on 
the sample statement in Figure 8-7 of the Army Source Selection Guide. 
 




As Source Selection Authority for this acquisition, I have 
determined that the ____ product/service proposed by Offeror A 
provides the best overall value to satisfy Army needs. This selection was 
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made based upon the factors and sub factors established in the 
solicitation and my integrated assessment and comparison of the 
strengths, weaknesses, and risks of the proposals submitted in response 
to the solicitation. This memorandum documents the basis for my 
decision. 
 
b. Brief description of the product/service being procured. 
 
c. Brief description of the basis for award, including the major factors against which 
proposals were measured and their relative order of importance. 
 
d. A list of offerors in the competitive range. 
 
e. Rationale for business judgments and tradeoffs. Include the following: 
 
__Succinct comparison of each proposal, focusing on key proposal 
differences (strengths, weaknesses, and risks) that surfaced in the evaluation and 
their impact on the acquisition. 
 
__Explanation of specific tradeoffs that led to the decision. 
 
__Explanation of specific benefits of the technically superior offeror(s) 
and why they are or are not significant enough to warrant any additional cost. 
 




In summary, based on my integrated assessment of all proposals 
in accordance with the specified evaluation factors and sub factors, it is 
my decision that Offeror A’s proposal offers the best overall value. 
 
IX.  Certifications/Clearances:   
 
   Yes  No  N/A  
a. ___ ___ ___ Was POM approved by appropriate authority before discussions?  
 
b. ___ ___ ___ Is the offeror on the List of Parties Excluded from Federal 
Procurement and Non-procurement Programs? 
 
c. ___ ___ ___ Certificate of Cost and Pricing data received? 
 
f. ___ ___ ___ Has offeror submitted all required certifications? 
 
g. ___ ___ ___ Was a satisfactory subcontracting plan submitted? 
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h. ___ ___ ___ Was the PNM reviewed by an Installation Contract Review Board? 
(Attach signature/comment page) 
 
X.  Attachments: 
 
If the PNM is the Source Selection Decision document, attach the documents that 
support the evaluation and source selection decision.  Do not include proposals, proposal 
cover sheets, or audits.  Include cost/price, technical, management, past performance, and 
subcontracting plan evaluation documents, only when the subject cannot be adequately 
covered in a summary statement in the body of the PNM or separate attachment.  When 
in doubt, do not include information that may be proprietary or source selection sensitive.  





PRENEGOTIATION OBJECTIVE MEMORANDUM (POM) 
 
FOR NONCOMPETITIVE AWARDS  
 




I.  Solicitation Number:  DABTXX-02-R-0000 
 
II.  Contract Type:  (Insert contract type and period of performance. Include any options 
for additional performance.) 
 
III.  Brief Description of Requirement:  (See description from POM).  
 
IV.  BACKGROUND:  This requirement is sole source.  See attached J&A dated dd/mm/
yyyy. 
 
V.  ACQUISITION CHRONOLOGY 
 
:  See POM 
 




Specialist :_________________ Title __________________ Date__________ 
 
Reviewed by: 
   Contracting 
   Officer :_________________ Title __________________ Date__________ 
 
   Legal*  :_________________ Title __________________ Date__________ 
 
   DOC*    :_________________ Title __________________ Date__________ 
 
   Other   :_________________ Title __________________ Date__________ 
 
Approved by:_________________ Title __________________ Date__________ 
 
* Only include/use SJA and DOC signature lines when required by the ACA, 





V.  Approval of this POM authorizes negotiations to begin with Company A, within the 
limits defined below.  
 
 Proposed Objective Questioned 
Cost $1,869,000 $1,866,087 $2,913 
Profit 131,000 130,626 374 
Total Price $2,000,000 $1,996,713 $3,287 
 
An evaluation of Company A's cost proposal resulted in the following areas of questioned 
cost: 
 
(a) Labor:   
 
1.  The proposed labor rate of $7.50/hr. for Technician Level I is 
overstated.  The DOL wage rate and/or historical data of prices paid in this geographical 
area indicate $7.25/hr. is reasonable.  Applying the recommended rate to the 10,000 
estimated hours in the proposal results in questioned cost of $2,500.  The rate will be 
discussed during negotiations.  
Questioned Cost of $2,500 
 
2.  The labor rate of $78.50/hr. proposed for the Project Manager's 
(PM) is excessive.  The rate includes base pay of $50.00/hr. plus $28.50/hr. in fringe 
benefits and corporate overhead.  DCAA found that the proposed rate includes $8.50/hr. 
for corporate overhead rate that should not be included resulting in a recommended rate 
of $70.00/hr.  When applied to 2087 hours for a full time PM, the $8.50/hr. reduction in 
rate equates to $17,740 of questioned cost.  The rate will be discussed during 
negotiations. 
Questioned Cost of $17,740  
 
3.  During fact-finding discussions with Company A, it was discovered 
that their cost proposal should be increased to include one additional Technician II 
position.  The DOL wage rate for a Technician II is $8.50/hr.  For a full time equivalent, 
this would equate to a cost increase of $17,740 (2087 hrs. X $8.50). 
Additional Cost of $17,740 
 
4.  Summary of Questioned Labor Cost:: 
 
Labor Rates                                    $2,500 
Project Manager                           $17,740 
Staffing Adjustment                      ($17,740) 
Net Questioned Labor cost              $2,500 
 
(b) Equipment/Material:  All equipment/material for this requirement will be 
Government furnished (GFE).  Company A did not propose any equipment/material cost. 
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(c) Miscellaneous/Other Proposed Cost:  (Include, if any)  
 
(d) G&A:  Company A's proposed G&A rate of 9.5% is acceptable.  However, 
when applied to the Government's adjusted cost objectives, a total of $238 G&A cost is 
questioned. 
Questioned cost $238 
 
(e) Profit/Fee:  Based on profit analysis using the weighted guidelines, no 
exception is taken to the proposed profit rate of 7 per cent.  However, $857 profit/fee is 
questioned based on application of the proposed profit rate of 7% to the baseline 
questioned costs. 
Questioned Profit $857 
 
(f) Technical Issues:  
 
Company A proposed three (3) full time equivalents (FTE) for the 
Technician I position.  Based on the PWS and the number of areas to be mowed, a 
minimum of four (4) FTEs should be required.  The offeror will be asked to support the 
use of 3 Technician is, or adjust their proposed staffing in their revised proposal. 
 
IX.  Request approval to begin negotiations with Company A.: 
 
X.  Attachments:  List only the attachments included as part of the POM.  Include only 
attachments that are necessary to support negotiation objectives, negotiation issues, and 
competitive range determinations.  However, do not include proposals, proposal cover 
sheets, or audits.  Only include cost/price, technical, management, past performance, and 
subcontracting plan evaluation documents, when the subject cannot be adequately 
covered in a summary statement in the body of the POM or separate attachment.  When 
in doubt, do not include information that may be proprietary.  If needed, it can be 





PRICE NEGOTIATION MEMORANDUM (PNM) 
 
FOR NONCOMPETITIVE AWARDS  
 
(EXAMPLE IS FOR HYPOTHETICAL NON COMMERCIAL SERVICE) 
 
 
I.  Solicitation Number:  DABTXX-02-R-0000 
 
II.  Contract Type:  Insert contract type and period of performance. Include any options 
for additional performance. 
 
III.  Description of Requirement:  (See description from POM).  
 
IV.  Extent of Competition:  This requirement is sole source.  See attached J&A dated dd/
mm/yyyy. 
 




Specialist :_________________ Title __________________ Date__________ 
 
Reviewed by: 
   Contracting 
   Officer :_________________ Title __________________ Date__________ 
 
   Legal*  :_________________ Title __________________ Date__________ 
 
   DOC*    :_________________ Title __________________ Date__________ 
 
   Other   :_________________ Title __________________ Date__________ 
 
Approved by:_________________ Title __________________ Date__________ 
 
* Only include/use SJA and DOC signature lines when required by the ACA, 
Region Headquarter’s Document Submission Requirements or Regulations. 
 
V.  Participants in Negotiations: 
 
a.  Face-to-face negotiations were conducted 2-5 August 2002 at the Fort Future 
DOC office.   
 
b.  (List discussion topics or include as an attachment.) 
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c.  The following individuals participated in the negotiation/discussions: 
   
Name:     Title/Organization: 
 
John Doe     Pres. XYZ, Inc. 
Jane Jones    Contracting Officer, Fort Future 
Jack Smith    Legal Advisor, Fort Future 
_____________________    ____________________________   
_____________________    ____________________________ 
 
VI.  Certifications/Clearances:   
 
   Yes  No  N/A  
a. ___ ___ ___ Was POM approved by appropriate authority prior to negotiations?  
 
b. ___ ___ ___ Is the offeror on the List of Parties Excluded from Federal 
Procurement and Non-procurement Programs? 
 
c. ___ ___ ___ Certificate of Cost and Pricing data received? 
 
f. ___ ___ ___ Has the offeror complied with/submitted all required certifications? 
 
g. ___ ___ ___ Was a satisfactory subcontracting plan submitted? 
 
h. ___ ___ ___ Was the PNM reviewed by an Installation Contract Review Board? 




VII.  Results of Negotiations:  
 
 Proposed Objective Questioned Negotiated 
Cost $1,869,000 $1,866,087 $2,913 $1,862,446 
Profit 131,000 130,626 374 130,371 
Total Price $2,000,000 $1,996,713 $3,287 $1,992,817 
 
a.  Cost:  A summary of proposed costs, Government objective costs, and cost 
values that are considered negotiated follows: 
 
 Proposed Objective Questioned Negotiated 
Dir. Cost $1,706,994 $1,704,494 $2,500 $1,700,864 
G&A 162,165 161,927 238 161,582 
Total $2,000,000 $1,997,087 $2,913 $1,992,817 
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(1) Direct Cost (Labor): As a result of negotiations, labor costs were reduced from 
their initial proposal by $6,130, as follows: 
 
 Proposed Objective Questioned Negotiated 
Technician I $75,000 $72,500 $2,500 $72,500 
Project Manager $163,829 $146,090 $17,740 $146,090 
Technician II $1,468,165 $1,485,904 ($17,740) $1,482,274 
Total $1,706,994 $1,704,494 $2,500 $1,700,864 
 
i. Company A proposed a $7.50/hr. wage rate for a Technician I.  The 
prevailing DOL wage determination listed the rate at $7.25/hr.  The difference in 
the rates resulted in $2,500 of questioned cost.  During discussions, Company A 
agreed that the DOL rate of $7.25 should apply. 
 
ii. Company A proposed a burdened Labor rate of $78.50/hr. for their Project 
Manager.  DCAA found the fringe/overhead portion of the rate to be overstated by 
$8.50/hr. and recommended a rate of $70.00/hr.  This resulted in $17,740 of 
questioned cost.  During negotiations, Company A agreed that the DCAA 
recommended rate should apply. 
 
iii.  Analysis of Company A's technical staffing proposal found that the 
proposal was understated by one Technician II position.  The DOL wage rate for the 
position is $8.50/hr., or $17,740 annually.  The $17,740 understatement was reflected 
in the Government’s negotiation objective.  During negotiations, it was determined 
that the task could be performed more efficiently by adding one part time Technician 
II at 1660 hours per year versus the 2087 used in the Government’s negotiation 
objective.  This results in a price increase of $14,109 (1660 hrs. x $8.50/hr. = 
$14,109) from $1,468,165 to $1,482,274.  
 
(2) Equipment/Material:  No direct material or equipment was proposed.  All 
material/equipment GFE/GFP. 
 
(3) Indirect Cost (G&A): 
 
 Proposed Objective Questioned Negotiated 
 $162,165 $161,927 $238 $161,582 
 
Company A proposed $162,165 for G&A cost based on application of 9.5% G&A to 
the proposed total direct cost of $1,706,994.  The 9.5% rate was audited by DCAA 
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and determined reasonable.  The Government questioned $238 of the proposed G&A 
cost based on application of the 9.5% G&A rate to the total direct cost objective of 
$1,704,494.  the amount considered negotiated for Indirect Costs is derived by 





Based on profit analysis using the weighted guidelines, no exception is taken to the 
proposed profit rate of 7 per cent.  The $130,371 profit is derived by applying the 7 
per cent rate to the considered negotiated costs. 
 
VIII.  Attachments:  List and attach documents required to support the price 





(a) SIMPLIFIED ACQUISITION PROCEDURES 
(i) DOCUMENTATION OF PRICE REASONABLENESS 
RFP/RFQ/PR NUMBER:  
 
Date 
ITEM DESCRIPTION:  
 
Offeror Price/Quote 
1.   
2.   
3.   
4.  
5.   
In accordance with FAR 13.106-3(a), the award price is reasonable based on: 
(If Competitive quotations or offers is not selected, attach brief explanation) 
 Competitive quotations or offers. 
 Market research. 
 Comparison of the proposed price with prices found reasonable on previous purchases. 
 Current price lists, catalogs, or advertisements. 
 A comparison with similar items in a related industry. 
 The contracting officer’s personal knowledge of the item being purchased. 
 Comparison to an independent Government estimate. 
 Other reasonable basis (explain) 
 
 The item can be obtained only from a supplier that quotes a minimum order price or quantity 
that unreasonably exceeds stated quantity requirements or results in an unreasonable price for 
the quantity required. The contracting officer has informed the requiring activity of all facts 
regarding the quotation or offer and ask it to confirm or alter its requirement. Attached 
document describes and supports the final action taken. 
AWARD TO:                                                                                        AWARD AMOUNT: 
Buyer/Specialist: Date 
Contracting Officer: Date 







The following checklist contains most required determinations, approvals, and specific 
considerations IAW FAR, DFARS, & AFARS as applicable to the instant acquisition and 
as of the writing of this guide.  However, this is not an all-inclusive listing and additions/
deletions may be appropriate due to changes to the regulations and/or ACA or PARC 
requirements, or in support of a local requirement.  
 
1. Determinations and Findings (D&F) to exclude a source (FAR 6.202, and Subpart 1.8) 
number ________was approved on ____________by ____________  
__________________________.  Attached as Exhibit_______. 
 
2.  D&F for public interest circumstances permitting other than full and open competition 
(FAR 6.302-7 and Subpart 1.7) number ____________was approved on ___________ 
by____________________.  Attached as Exhibit_______. 
 
3.  Justification for Other than Full & Open Competition (see FAR 6-303), number 
______was approved on___________ by __________________.   If approved at other 
than the Secretarial level a copy is attached as Exhibit______. 
 
4.  Acquisition Plan (AP) Number _______ dated ______________was approved on 
___________ by _____________________.  This acquisition is in conformity with the 
approved AP.  Yes_______ No _________.  If no, include explanation. 
 
5.  This acquisition was synopsized on FedBizOps.  Yes_______ No______.  If no, 
include explanation of the applicable exception in the POM. 
 
6. a. Proposed services have been determined to be non-personal (FAR 37.103(a))  
Yes______ No_______ N/A_______.  If no, complete paragraph 6.b. below and include 
explanation in POM. 
 
   b.  Proposed services have been determined to be personal and the category of services 
is in conformity with (see DFARS 237.104 and AFARS 5137.104-90).  A D&F to contract 
for personal services was approved by _____________________ on _____________.  Yes 
_____ N/A _______ . 
 
7.  The proposed procurement has been reviewed by the contracting officer and SADBUS 
for Small and Disadvantaged Business and Labor Surplus Area consideration.  Yes_____ 
No______ N/A______.  If no, include explanation in POM.  (FAR 19.502) 
 
8.  Warranty clause approval has been obtained (DFARS 247.704). 
Yes _____ No ______ N/A______.  If no, include explanation in the POM. 
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9.  None of the exceptions to cost or pricing data at FAR 15.3 apply.  Yes ____ No ____.  
If yes, 
 
    a.  The contractor(s) has/have submitted Cost & Pricing information IAW FAR 15.408.  
Yes _____ No _____.  If no, include explanation in the POM. 
 
    b.  Cost & Pricing information IAW FAR 15.806 has been submitted for all major sub-
contractors.  Yes_____ No ______ N/A _______.  If no, include explanation in the POM. 
 
    c.  Audits and/or field pricing reports requested after consideration of the criteria at 
FAR 15.404, have been received.  Yes_____ No ______.  If no, include explanation in 
POM. 
 
10.  An approved make or buy plan is on file (DFARS 215.407-2).  Yes______ No 
______ N/A ______. 
 







The following checklist provides a listing of required determinations, approvals, and 
specific considerations IAW FAR, DFARS, & AFARS as applicable to the instant 
acquisition and as of the writing of this guide.  However, this is not to be considered an 
all-inclusive listing, and additions/deletions may be required by changes to the 
regulations and/or ACA or PARC requirements, or in support of a local requirement.  
 
1.  A Disclosure Statement describing the contractor's cost accounting practices and 
procedures was submitted on __________________(FAR Appendix B, Part 9903.202).  
The responsible contracting officer determined that the Disclosure Statement was current, 
accurate and complete on ______________. 
 
2.  The contractor has an adequate accounting system as determined by the Contracting 
Office/DCAA on _______________. 
 
3.  The contractor has an approved purchasing system (FAR 44.305) as determined by the 
contracting officer on _______________. 
 
4.  The prospective contractor has been determined to be responsible within the meaning 
of FAR Subpart 9.103.  Yes ________ No ________.  If no, include explanation in the 
PNM. 
 
5.  Exception to the Buy American Act has been obtained.  Yes ______ No ________ N/
A _______.  If no, include explanation in the PNM. 
 
6.  Progress Payments authorized (FAR 32.5):  Customary ______ Flexible ______ 
Unusual ______.  If unusual, include explanation and describe approvals obtained. 
 
7.  Certification of independent price determination received from the successful offeror 
(FAR 3-103-1)(fixed price only).   Yes _____ No ______ N/A _____.  If no, include 
explanation in PNM. 
 
8.  Is cost or pricing data required?  Yes ____ No ____.  If yes, 
 
   a. Has contractor submitted a certificate of current cost or pricing data per FAR 15.403-
4(b)(2) in format indicated at Part 15.406-2?  Yes ______ No _______ N/A _______. 
 
   b.  Has contractor submitted sub-contractor cost or pricing information on major sub-
contracts per FAR 15.408?  Yes _____ No _____ N/A _____. 
 
9.  The List of Debarred, Suspended and Ineligible Contractors has been checked.  (FAR 
9.404 & 9.405)  Yes _____ No _____ N/A ______.  If no, include explanation in PNM. 
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10. Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) compliance has been requested or obtained.  
Yes _____ No _____ N/A ______. 
 
11. Public announcement of award prepared and ready for issue per FAR 5.302 & 5.303.  
Yes_______ No_______ N/A _______. 
 
12.  Any other applicable compliances - notate here. 
 
from (Office of Secretary Defense, 2004)   
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APPENDIX J. COMPARISON OF U.S. AND PAKISTAN 
ACQUISITION/PROCUREMENT PROCESSES 




Contracting is recognized as a 
separate professional stream. 
 





An extensive training structure is 
available in the shape of institutions 





The legal framework in the U.S. 
mandates that agency heads build 
skill sets of the acquisition 
community with career progression 
and various appointments. 
 
The legal binding for capacity 
building makes it easy for agency 





The contracting personnel undergo 
different certification courses like 




PPRA conducts training of contracting 
personnel on a very limited scale. It does 
not have a structure to carry out 
extensive training. However, there is a 
need for a robust training institutional 
regime. 
 
Legislature does not bind agency heads 
for mandatory capacity building of the 




Agency heads meet training requirements 
from limited annual budgets. In times of 
sequestration, agency heads easily slash 
training programs of support services 
compared to the operational workforce. 
 
There are no certification courses related 




Different organizations like the 
DAU and NPS exist and contribute 
towards enhancement of skill level 
of acquisition community. 
 
Organizations like the DLA procures 
requirements of all agencies 
centrally. 
 
There is a dearth of educational 
organization that offers undergraduate- or 
graduate-level courses for skill 
enhancement of contracting workforce. 
 
Each military arm procures its own 
inventory needs. As a result, there is an 
efficiency loss in the system. 
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(2) 
Monitoring and Oversight 
 
Organizations like the DCMA and 
DCAA add to efficiency and 
effectiveness of the entire DOD by 
monitoring, administering, and 
overseeing contracting activities. 
 
 
There is an extensive audit system 
available in Pakistan; however, the 
contract administration is weak. 
(c) Protocols 
(1) 
Best Value Quantum 
 
The acquisition regulations envisage 
contracting personnel to use their 




The PPRA also envisages to obtain goods 





Negotiated procurement is 
considered a competitive method of 
procurement, besides sealed bidding. 
 
SAP provides flexibility by 
increasing financial thresholds in a 
declared contingency environment. 
The increase in SAP thresholds 
during contingencies helps provide 
swift support to warfighters. 
 
GSA schedule increases efficiency 
and effectiveness as eligible federal/
state/local government agencies 
order through GSA e-library or GSA 
advantage. It saves time and effort 
by avoiding redundant actions and 
enhances efficiency and 




Only sealed bidding is considered a 
competitive form of procurement. 
Negotiated procurement and revision of 
proposal is forbidden. 
 
War and peacetime procurement 






Though the armed services place 
multiple orders through rate running 
contracts, each agency maintains separate 
basic order agreements with suppliers 




TINA encompasses suppliers into 
the accountability loop because 
government agencies are permitted 
to audit records of vendors involved 




The legal framework does not encompass 
suppliers into the accountability loop 
because government agencies cannot 




Suppliers have to submit certificates 
regarding correctness, currency, and 
completeness of cost and pricing 
data. 
Suppliers are not mandated, by law, to 





The law provides protection and 
incentivizes whistleblowing by 
giving a share in recovered amount. 
 
 
Whistleblower protection law does not 
exist at the federal government level. 
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